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Abstract 
After the Irish property boom peaked in 2007, Ireland’s banks faced declining share prices 
and increasing liquidity pressures. When in the aftermath of the September 2008 collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, Ireland’s banks lost access to liquidity from abroad, it triggered a banking 
crisis in the country. In spite of various responses by the Irish government, the financial 
viability of Ireland’s banks (as well as the government’s fiscal position) continued to 
deteriorate in early 2009. The Irish government attributed the problem to impaired real 
estate assets sitting on bank balance sheets, which made it difficult for markets to believe 
that government’s upcoming capital injections would render the banks solvent. In response, 
the government created the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA), a majority 
privately owned asset management company (AMC), to remove these assets from the banks. 
The ownership structure was complex, being nominally privately owned so that NAMA 
would not appear on the government balance sheet. Most of the powers and benefits from 
ownership were structured so that they would accrue to the state. From its establishment 
under the NAMA Act on December 21, 2009, NAMA purchased assets with a face value of 
approximately €77.4 billion for €31.7 billion. As of December 31, 2018, it had disposed of all 
but €2.3 billion of these assets. NAMA was considered one of the best performing AMCs of 
the era and enjoyed an expansive legal mandate, but it was not sufficient to solve Ireland’s 
economic woes. Although NAMA was still operating as of 2019, it was projected to wind 
down by 2025 (having submitted a detailed wind-down plan by the end of 2021) and yield a 
profit of €4 billion. 
 




1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 





At a Glance  
In late 2008, uncertainty stemming from the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) burst the real estate bubble 
supporting Ireland’s economy and triggered a banking 
crisis. Between September 2008 and April 2009, the 
Irish government responded with blanket guarantees, 
bank recapitalizations, and bank nationalization, but 
the financial viability of the banks (as well as the 
government’s fiscal position) continued to 
deteriorate. Government analysts traced the 
credibility problem to the impaired real estate assets 
populating the balance sheets of Ireland’s largest 
banks. On April 7, 2009 the government 
recommended that Ireland establish a centralized, 
majority privately owned asset management 
company, the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA), to remove these assets from the balance 
sheets and persuade the market that its banks were 
adequately capitalized. NAMA would then manage and 
dispose of these assets, aiming to optimize returns for 
the Irish public. 
Ireland established NAMA on December 21, 2009, 
under the National Asset Management Agency Act 
2009. NAMA eventually purchased assets with a face 
value of approximately €74.4 billion for €31.8 billion 
by issuing government guaranteed securities. 
Although NAMA did not prevent Ireland from 
requiring an EU-IMF Programme that began in 
November 2010, NAMA disposed of all but €2.3 billion 
in remaining assets by the end of 2018 and projected 
that it would return over €4 billion in profit to the 
taxpayers by the anticipated end of its life in 2025.  
Summary Evaluation 
The effectiveness of NAMA at stabilizing the Irish 
economy is uncertain. The consensus seems to be that 
NAMA was effective at performing the functions asset 
management companies are expected to perform. As a 
whole, NAMA was considered one of the more well-
developed and commercially successful European 
asset management companies of the GFC era. Like the 
other interventions preceding Ireland’s eventual IMF-EU program, NAMA was not enough to solve Ireland’s 
financial problems. However, it was able to effectively carve out much of the toxic assets in Irish banks, making 
it possible to credibly recapitalize the banks. The problem was that Ireland did not have enough fiscal room to 
do this without an IMF-EU program. NAMA remained politically unpopular, having to grapple with the 
combination of a perceived transparency problem and early delays that further aggravated a sense of 
uncertainty.
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To stabilize the Irish banking sector and 
restore “the flow of credit […] while minimizing 




April 7, 2009 (Announcement), 
December 21, 2009 (Start of 
operations) (First asset transfer took 
place between March 29, 2010 and 




NAMA did not have an initial wind-
down date, but current policy is that 






The government did not know the 
extent of the NPL problem in 
commercial loans until NAMA began 
asset purchases. NAMA purchased 
land and property development loans 
as well as any assets related to such 




Not specified, but NAMA could issue 




Any credit institution could apply to 
NAMA, but the Finance Minister 
ultimately decided which applicants 
were eligible  
Usage Assets with a face value of €74.4 
billion purchased for €31.8 billion  









Extensive legal authority (though 
committed to limit use), hedged risk 
of overvaluation with claw back 
mechanism, off-balance-sheet SPV 
structure 
National Asset Management Agency 
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National Asset Management Agency (NAMA): Ireland Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted 
to USD) 
$276.5 billion in 2008 
$236.4 billion in 2009 
$222.5 billion in 2010 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted 
to USD) 
$61,263 in 2008 
$52,105 in 2009 
$48,715 in 2010. 
 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year 
senior debt) 
 





As of Q4, 2009: 
Fitch: AA- 
Moody’s: Aa1 (negative outlook) 
S&P: AA  
 





Size of banking system 
 
$470.0 billion in total assets in 2008 
$ 42.7 billion in total assets in 2009 
$ 373.4 billion in total assets in 2010 
Size of banking system as a percentage 
of GDP 
169.94% in 2008 
177.85% in 2009 
167.84% in 2010 
Size of banking system as a percentage 
of financial system 
 100% in 2008 
100% in 2009 
100% in 2010 
Five-bank concentration of banking 
system 
90.7% of total assets at the end of 2008 
90.8% of total assets at the end of 2009 
87.2% of total assets at the end of 2010 
Foreign involvement in banking 
system 
36.0% of total banking assets in 2008 
35.0% of total banking assets in 2009 
35.0% of total banking assets in 2010 
Government ownership of banking 
system 
0% at the end of 2008 
7.27% at the end of 2009 
20.69% at the end of 2010 
Existence of deposit insurance Early 2008: 90% of deposits, maximum payout of 
$27,777.78 (€20,000)  
September 2008: $138,888.90 (€100,000), no co-
insurance 
December 2008: Unlimited 
2009-10: $138,888.90 (€100,000), no co-insurance 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank Deposit 
Insurance Dataset; IMF International Financial Statistics. 
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At the outbreak of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Ireland had a domestic banking sector 
that was at least twice the size of its GDP, an open economic model, and bank governance (as 
well as bank risk management) that was perceived as poor (Cas and Peresa 2016; Carroll 
and Dodd 2012). Although the economy had revolved around a real estate bubble for several 
years, the government was widely seen as fiscally prudent (having maintained years of 
balanced budgets and over a decade of surpluses) (IMF 2015). However, its relatively small 
economy depended on tax receipts structured around a set of pro-cyclical taxes that the 
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland later said in 2010 “could leave [Ireland] vulnerable 
to a sudden crippling turnaround in the deficit and a rapid accumulation of debt” (Honohan 
2010). These factors contributed to the GFC’s early and intense impact on the Irish economy 
after the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. As liquidity disappeared and the 
property values buttressing the Irish economy collapsed, GDP shrunk rapidly in 2008 and 
2009.   
As the crisis began to spread, the government of Ireland sought to stem the contagion by 
announcing an ~€440 billion blanket guarantee (over double Ireland’s GDP) of virtually all 
the liabilities of six large domestic banks on September 30, 2008, called the Credit 
Institutions Financial Support Scheme (CIFS); (New Bagehot 2019).3 (See Figure 3.) 
However, the world gradually realized that these banks might have a solvency problem, not 
just a liquidity problem.  
Figure 1: Republic of Ireland Property and GDP Data from 2005 to 2019  
 
3 The six participating banks were Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Bank of Ireland (BOI), Anglo Irish Bank (ANGLO), 
Educational Building Society (EBS), Irish Life & Permanent (IL&P), and Irish Nationwide Building Society 
(INBS). 
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Source: Central Statistics Office 2019. 
Uncertainty regarding the six banks’ potential losses continued to grow (Oireachtas Inquiry 
2016; Schoenmaker 2015). This uncertainty began to weigh on the sovereign (IMF 2015, 51-
52). In response, the Irish government nationalized Anglo Irish Bank, Ireland’s third largest 
bank, with a €4 billion capital injection on January 15, 2009. It also injected €3.5 billion into 
each of the two largest banks, Allied Irish Bank (AIB) and Bank of Ireland. The government 
capital kept Ireland’s domestic banks alive, but impaired real estate assets on their balance 
sheets continued to grow. This made raising capital from the private sector impossible, 
which in turn damaged their ability to make loans (Schoenmaker 2015; Quigley 2010). On 
the ground, these impaired real estate assets materialized in the form of incomplete 
developments and numerous properties in a legal limbo between default and foreclosure 









4 This was exacerbated by the fact that the Irish legal system for collecting on real estate collateral/dealing with 
residential mortgages in arrears was “characterised by difficulties in collateral realisation and numerous court 
adjournments” (See Cas and Peresa 2016). 
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Figure 2: Irish sovereign bond yields diverging from the European baseline 




Source: GFD Finaeon. 
Policymakers believed the impaired real estate assets were toxic to the banks and would 
continue to rattle the markets until the losses associated with the assets became clear. In 
March 2009, Economist and Special Advisor to the government’s National Treasury 
Management Agency (NTMA)5, Peter Bacon, proposed that the government solve the 
problem by creating a “bad bank,” an asset management company that would “carve out [the 
relevant] impaired assets from […] the domestic banks” (Cas and Peresa 2016; Bacon 2009a; 
NAMA Business Plan 2010, 7). 
The government rejected relying on recapitalization alone as the “do nothing” option that 
“would not address the liquidity shortage or promote new lending” and “would increase the 
risk of sovereign default” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). Bacon conceded that an asset guarantee 
had the advantage of “no money upfront from government; no write down in banks’ balance 
sheet assets.” But he argued that the increasing uncertainty (as well as the increasingly 
negative market response) related to the €440 billion CIFS guarantee had increased the 
 
5 The NTMA is the Irish government agency that was responsible for managing the government’s assets and 








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Ireland 5-year bond yield Germany 5-year bond yield
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government’s borrowing costs. He noted that “the credit rating of sovereign Ireland […] 
[became] inextricably bound up with the issue of Irish banks capital adequacy” (Bacon 
2009).  
According to Bacon, government officials acknowledged that the asset-management 
approach would increase the government deficit and impose write-downs on banks that 
could “adversely impact equity investors and may require them to recapitalize.” Still, they 
decided on this approach because it would (Bacon 2009): 
● immediately “deal with the impaired property loans on the books” of the institutions 
covered by CIFS, which Bacon said “needed to be removed from the institutions 
before lending in the economy could resume;”  
● “improve liquidity by giving the institutions collateral in the form of Government 
bonds that could be used to access ECB funding;” 
● create “greater impartiality for working out problem loans,” which “might break 
‘crony capitalist’ connections that otherwise impede efficient transfers of assets from 
powerful enterprises” and “address public suspicion regarding the relationships 
between the banks and developers;” 
● be able to “manage the assets without the focus on impairment disclosure that the 
banks face;” and, 
● allow the banks something akin to a fresh start that would “allow management time 
to be refocused on rebuilding strength particularly in core retail businesses and 
maintaining their deposit bases” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). 
On April 7, 2009, the Minister for Finance announced that the Irish government would 
establish a “National Asset Management Agency […] to address the issue of asset quality in 
the banking system.” The Irish government then held public consultations on draft 
legislation during the August recess of the Oireachtas, Ireland’s parliament (Connolly 2017, 
8). The National Asset Management Agency Act 2009 (the NAMA Act) was introduced in the 
Oireachtas on September 8, 2009, and pre-notified to the EC on September 29, 2009 (NAMA 
Act 2009 2009; European Commission February 26, 2010). In the Oireachtas, the NAMA Act 
passed by a narrow margin on October 15, 2009, following a debate that involved an all-night 
session of the House (Connolly 2017). It was then signed into law by the President on 
November 22, 2009, formally established via a statutory instrument on December 21, 2009 
(S.I. No. 547 2009), and notified to the EC for approval under EU guidelines on impaired asset 
relief for banks as well as compliance with EU State aid rules on December 23, 2009 (NAMA 
Act 2009 2009; Oireachtas 2009; European Commission February 26, 2010). The EC 
approved NAMA on February 26, 2010, but required that the valuation and transfer of each 
tranche of assets to NAMA had to be notified to and reviewed by the EC (European 
Commission February 26, 2010). The Minister for Finance and the Board of NAMA also 
fleshed out NAMA’s features through numerous statutory instruments, guidelines, 
directions, and Codes of Practice over NAMA’s first few years (Oireachtas 2009; National 
Asset Management Agency [Conferral Of Additional Function] Order 2010; National Asset 
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Management Agency [Determination Of Long-Term Economic Value Of Property And Bank 
Assets] [Amendment] Regulations 2010). 




























194.1 26.5% €3.5 bn 
(preference 
Shares) 
N Y Y N 
Allied Irish 
Banks  
179.5 24.5% €3.5 bn 
(preference 
Shares) 
N Y Y N 
Anglo Irish 
Bank 
88.5 12.1% 100% N Y Y Y 
Irish Life & 
Permanent 
74.3 10.1% N/A N Y N N 
Bank of 
Scotland  
54.1  7.4% N/A Y N N N 
Ulster 
Bank 
48.7  6.6% N/A Y N N N 
National 
Irish Bank  
28.2 3.8% N/A Y N N N 
EBS 21.4 2.9% N/A N Y Y N 
KBC 21.1 2.9% N/A Y N N N 
INBS 14.4  2.0% N/A N Y Y Y 
ACCBank  8.4  1.2% N/A Y N N N 
 
Sources: Author’s Calculations; New Bagehot 2019; Oireachtas Inquiry 2016. 
Program Description 
NAMA’s overarching purposes and goals were set down in the NAMA Act (National Asset 
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA’s mandate (which NAMA refers to as 
its purpose) was set down in the NAMA Act. NAMA’s overarching mandate was to stabilize 
the Irish banking sector and restore “the flow of credit […] while minimizing the risk to the 
taxpayer” (NAMA 2009). The NAMA’s foundational legislation listed six aspirational goals for 
NAMA: 
● Clarify and force the write-downs of losses related to certain assets on the balance 
sheets of systemically important organizations (Ireland’s largest domestic banks); 
● Remove uncertainty about bad assets, improving the availability of credit in Ireland; 
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● Protect the State’s interest in respect of its liability guarantees;  
● Protect taxpayers by facilitating the restructuring of credit institutions of systemic 
importance to the economy; 
● Restore confidence in the banking sector; 
● Contribute to Ireland’s socio-economic development (Cas and Peresa 2016; National 
Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
In its first annual report, NAMA described three goals it had set to accomplish the mandates 
the government had given it: 
● identify and expeditiously buy eligible impaired assets from participating credit 
institutions; 
● protect (and enhance if possible) the value of those assets in the interest of, and finally 
get the “best possible achievable financial return” for, the Republic of Ireland; and 
● recover all taxpayer payments for the assets as well as whatever NAMA invests to 
enhance the property assets underlying those assets (NAMA Annual Report 2010). 
NAMA was a statutory body6 and operated under the aegis of the Department of Finance’s 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA). The NTMA was the Irish government 
agency that was responsible for managing the government’s assets and liabilities (NTMA 
2019; NAMA Annual Report 2010).7 The NAMA Act gave the agency “all powers necessary 
for, or incidental to, the achievement of its purposes and the performance of its functions.”8 
The Act forbade NAMA from violating the laws of any jurisdiction. It also required NAMA’s 
property development activities to follow “proper planning and sustainable development as 
expressed in Government policy and in any relevant regional planning guidelines […] and 
development plans” (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
As can be seen in Figure 4, NAMA operated through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to keep 
its liabilities off the government’s balance sheet. NAMA set up some of these SPVs under 
Section 110 of Ireland’s Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 to minimize its tax burden (NAMA 
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).9 The parent SPV (National Asset Management Agency 
 
6 On a regulatory level, NAMA wasn’t classified as a bank and various parts of Irish competition law didn’t apply 
to it (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018) 
7 NTMA provided (or procured) business, support, and IT services and systems to NAMA in addition to staff 
that would serve as “officers” within NAMA. However, NAMA staff had to conform to the requirements for 
Members related to disclosure and eligibility for acting as a director of a company outlined in the NAMA Act 
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018) 
8 For more detail on the difference between NAMA’s purposes, the purposes of the NAMA Act, and NAMA’s 
functions, see the NAMA Act’s preambulatory clauses/recitals section, Section 10 of the Act, and Section 11 of 
the Act. 
9 The use of Section 110 companies in this manner was allowed under the relevant tax legislation and not 
uncommon for financial companies in Ireland at this time. 
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Investment Ltd., called NAMAIL or the Invest Co.) had an initial capitalization of €100 million 
and was 51%-owned by private investors and 49%-owned by NAMA (Martin 2010). 
However, NAMA’s liabilities dwarfed its capital. The 51% private equity holders had little 
influence on NAMA and their return on equity was capped at 10% above the yield on Irish 
government 10-year bonds (Braakman and Forster 2011). 
As can be seen in Figure 4, NAMA operated through special purpose vehicles (SPVs) to keep 
its liabilities off the government’s balance sheet. NAMA set up some of these SPVs under 
Section 110 of Ireland’s Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 to minimize its tax burden (NAMA 
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).10 The parent SPV (National Asset Management Agency 
Investment Ltd., called NAMAIL or the Invest Co.) had an initial capitalization of €100 million 
and was 51%-owned by private investors and 49%-owned by NAMA (Martin 2010). 
However, NAMA’s liabilities dwarfed its capital. The 51% private equity holders had little 
influence on NAMA and their return on equity was capped at 10% above the yield on Irish 


















10 The use of Section 110 companies in this manner was allowed under the relevant tax legislation and not 
uncommon for financial companies in Ireland at this time. 
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Figure 4: NAMA’s Corporate Structure 
 
 
Source: NAMA March 31, 2010, Section 55 Quarterly Report. 
Application Process 
Once NAMA was established (on December 21, 2009), any credit institution, including Irish 
subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions, that wished to participate had 60 days (until 
February 19, 2010) to apply (Martin 2010). Five of the six major banks that participated in 
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Ireland’s liability guarantee applied to NAMA for assistance. The sixth, IL&P, was heavily 
exposed to the real estate industry and was dependent on wholesale funding, like the others. 
However, 85% of its assets were residential rather than the commercial properties on which 
NAMA focused. It based its decision on each bank’s systemic importance, financial position, 
and compliance with all NAMA obligations (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, 
Revised 2018; Oireachtas Inquiry 2016a).  
Ireland’s Financial Regulator11 and the Minister for Finance could require participants to 
produce any report they considered necessary for monitoring compliance.  After 
consultations with the Governor of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, the 
Minister for Finance could require participants to produce restructuring plans and/or 
business plans by a certain time. With approval from the Minister for Finance, the Financial 
Regulator could also issue directions to participants. These directions could restrict balance 
sheet growth, the ability of participants to conduct mergers or acquisitions, or require 
balance sheet reduction, so long as the purpose of the direction was to achieve the purposes 
of the NAMA Act (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
Identifying Eligible Assets 
The Minister for Finance defined eligible bank assets using several criteria. The program 
accepted “all loans issued for the purchase, exploitation or development of land as well as 
loans either secured or guaranteed by land” and “some of their associated commercial loans.” 
The program also accepted “financial contracts between a debtor and a participating bank 
[…] that relate in whole or in part to acquired loans" (i.e. derivatives). Upon being admitted 
into the NAMA program, participants would identify all their eligible bank assets for NAMA. 
They would do this using a set of standardized templates that outlined legal due diligence, 
information about current market value of collateral, etc. (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 
2010). NAMA also based its determination of whether an asset was eligible on “borrower 
relationship level impairment” rather than asset level impairment.12 The Irish authorities 
expected eligible assets to be “concentrated on a small number of very large real estate 
developers, involved across the whole cycle of property development” (Martin 2010, 5). 
NAMA then determined which eligible assets it would acquire. In its October 13, 2009, Draft 
Business Plan, NAMA estimated that there were eligible assets with an initial book value of 
 
11 The Financial Regulator, alternatively the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority, was Ireland’s single 
financial regulator. It existed beneath the Central Bank of Ireland (though it had its own governance structure 
with a separate board from the central bank) until October 2010, when its functions were officially absorbed 
by the Central Bank of Ireland and the Financial Regulator dissolved (See “Financial regulation”, Citizens 
Information, Citizens Information Board, 
https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/consumer_affairs/financial_services/financial_products/financial_re
gulator.html; Honohan 2019)  
12 “Borrower relationship level impairment” refers to analysis looking at the extent that liabilities under various 
loans born by individual borrower were larger than the value of its underlying assets first instead of looking at 
the loans from an institution-by-institution point of view, which would ignore situations where one institution 
was not impaired (because they may have held a first lien mortgage) while multiple other institutions which 
had given the borrower things like a second mortgage or a line-of-equity  were impaired. (See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/234489/234489_1086237_117_2.pdf) 
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approximately €77 billion available and a current market value of approximately €47 billion. 
NAMA projected it would pay €54 billion in consideration for these assets, based on an 
estimate of their long-term economic value (NAMA Business Plan 2009). 
Valuation and Transfer 
Participants would give NAMA additional due diligence reports and other information 
necessary for valuing the assets as well as the assets’ underlying security. After having 
appointed experts to review the information for completeness, NAMA transferred the 
information to a panel that would actually conduct the valuation.13 The panel then used 
discounted cash-flow models set down by the government to calculate the current market 
value of the underlying property and assets as of November 30, 2009. The panel also 
calculated the “Long Term Economic Value” of the underlying property and assets, which 
involved a 0-25% positive adjustment to the loan’s value. There was also a 20% limit on the 
extent to which the aggregate long-term economic value calculated for all land valued in 
connection to a given participant’s portfolio could exceed the portfolio’s aggregate market 
value (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010). 
Once the panel of loan valuers arrived at a valuation, NAMA grouped the assets based on 
their shared relationships with a given borrower rather than by bank and sorted them into 
tranches for transfer (each tranche would contain all of the loans related to a certain set of 
borrowers across multiple participant institutions). Each additional tranche contained a 
larger number of borrowers with smaller positions. NAMA determined a transfer schedule 
for each tranche and provided it to the relevant participants. This transfer schedule set down 
the assets that NAMA would acquire from the relevant participant and the consideration 
price NAMA would pay, which would be “the lower of the amount owed by the borrower and 
the loan’s long-term economic value” (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010, 13). Within 
20 days of providing the participants with the transfer schedule, the assets would be 
transferred to NAMA (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018, PDF Page 
74-75). 
Alongside the transfer, NAMA’s Master SPV would issue government-guaranteed securities 
worth 95% of the price it intended to pay for acquiring the relevant assets and perpetual 
unguaranteed subordinated debt (effectively equity) worth 5% of the price it intended to 
 
13 For most of the loans (those related to borrowers that did not hold the top 150 largest positions in NAMA) 
experts were likely drawn from the participant banks, who were to set up specialized divisions that would 
“assess and value the loans to be transferred” (Frank Connolly NAMA Land. 2017. Page 14-15). NAMA’s panel 
for valuing the loans was composed of personnel from Alvarez and Marsal, Ernst and Young, FTI Consulting 
Ltd, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and UHY Hacker Young LLP. (See 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151016162759/https://www.nama.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/
Procurement/ContractAwardLoanAssocValServices.pdf.) NAMA relied on Societe Generale Securities Services 
(SGSS) for external experts on valuing derivatives associated with the loans. (See 
https://web.archive.org/web/20151016152359/https://www.nama.ie/about-us/our-work/procurement/.) 
For the underlying real estate, NAMA appointed seven different five-organization-panels, each corresponding 




National Asset Management Agency Nye
 
 
pay for acquiring the relevant assets. The Acquirer Co. would then purchase the assets by 
using these securities (Carroll and Dodd 2012; Boudghene and Maes 2012). (See Figure 5.) 
The participating institution could then use the government guaranteed securities as 
collateral to obtain cash from the European Central Bank and redeem the subordinated debt 
based on NAMA’s financial performance (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).  
Before the NAMA Act of 2009 was passed, NAMA estimated the first transfers would begin 
by December 2009 (NAMA Business Plan 2009). By February 2010, EC documents estimated 
that transfers wouldn’t begin until the end of that month. During its initial approval of NAMA, 
the EC estimated that NAMA would complete the transfers approximately seven months 
after the EC authorization, placing the expected date of the last transfer somewhere in late 
September 2010. NAMA revised its estimate for this end-date several times between 2009 
and 2011, having initially estimated that purchases would take less than a year (Martin 
2010).  
Figure 5: NAMA’s Operating Model 
 
 
Source: Boudghene and Maes 2012, 789. 
Asset Management  
Upon acquiring its assets, NAMA would require each relevant borrower to produce a 
business plan that outlined the borrower’s financial position and strategy for repayment 
(NAMA Management of Loans 2012). NAMA (or, where NAMA delegated portions of this task, 
a participant) would review the business plan and could work with the borrower to decide 
how the assets would be managed. This process might result in an agreement, a term sheet, 
an MOU, or a number of other instruments that could contain terms setting down “a new 
repayment schedule, restructuring or revision of the loans and/or a program of early 
disposal.” Alternatively, this process could also result in NAMA enforcing against a borrower 
(Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
NAMA expected to delegate asset management duties for the vast majority of its assets to 
participating banks (Connolly 2017). It also expected that it would manage the assets related 
to the “largest 100/150 borrowers” itself, which made up 80% of the value of the assets 
acquired. NAMA intended to monitor these large borrowers directly and leave the 
administration of their loans with the participants. For the rest of the borrowers, the 
participants would handle much of the monitoring and administrative duties. However, 
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these participants would ultimately submit information on the borrower’s performance 
history and the level of impairment of their loans to NAMA for oversight (NAMA Business 
Plan 2009).   
Funding Source and Estimated Returns 
NAMA could fund itself by issuing debt securities for the purchase of assets or it could be 
funded through the actions of the Minister for Finance or the actions of private sector 
investors. The Minister for Finance could issue debt securities or lend money to NAMA from 
the government’s Central Fund (Carroll and Dodd 2012). NTMA provided NAMA with 
“treasury services and advice” in connection with these actions (National Asset Management 
Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
There was a €54 billion cap on the amount of debt that NAMA could use for acquiring bank 
assets and a €5 billion principal cap on the amount of debt NAMA could have outstanding for 
all other purposes. This borrowing was expected to be done via the issuance of commercial 
paper, not via loans from the Irish government. The NAMA Act allowed NAMA to pay up to 
5% of the consideration cost (the cost of acquiring assets) by issuing subordinated debt 
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA would pay for the 
other 95% of the consideration cost using state guaranteed debt securities (later referred to 
as NAMA’s senior bonds) (NAMA Brief Guide 2010). The subordinated debt carried an 
interest rate linked to the Irish 10-year Government Bond Yield while the interest rate of the 
guaranteed debt securities was set at the six-month Euribor (NAMA Acquisition of Bank 
Assets 2010). 
Disposal Strategy and Timeline 
NAMA estimated that it would manage the assets it acquired for 7-10 years, but (NAMA Brief 
Guide 2010) NAMA and the EC did not envision when NAMA would start disposing of assets 
or when said disposals would conclude (beyond NAMA’s expected December 21, 2020 
termination date) (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA’s 
draft business plan did not contain a disposal policy. Its policy as of June 2010 was to “reflect 
market conditions in its decision as to whether to sell individual properties with the goal of 
disposing of assets in a phased and orderly manner.” NAMA emphasized that it would “not 
engage in any speculative hoarding of assets” (NAMA Business Plan 2010). Beyond this, the 
NAMA Act specified two approaches to disposal. One was conventional disposal “in the 
market for the best achievable price” (Carroll and Dodd 2012). The other involved the 
securitization or refinancing of loans (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
Powers 
NAMA enjoyed extensive powers to carry out its mandate, having been provided with “all 
the powers necessary or expedient for, or incidental to the achievement of its purposes and 
the performance of its functions” under the NAMA Act (NAMA Progress Report 2014). The 
Act also specified a number of NAMA’s powers, which included but were not limited to 
modified legal procedures, an ability to conduct compulsory land acquisitions, and a capacity 
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to unilaterally amend loans (Martin 2010).14 NAMA also could compel applicants and 
participants to provide NAMA with information that it deemed relevant. It had the ability to 
enforce the disclosure of information through the High Court (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
As part of its submissions to the EC, the Irish government committed NAMA to use many of 
these powers sparingly and to report annually to the EC about their use. The powers in 
question tended to be those that circumvented or modified law related to real estate and 
creditor-debtor relations (Martin 2010, 18-19).  
Governance 
NAMA was governed by a nine-member board, including two ex-officio members 
(Braakmann and Forster 2011). The board’s role was to ensure that NAMA performed its 
functions effectively. The board set the strategic objectives and targets and ensured that 
appropriate systems and procedures were in place (Carroll and Dodd 2012). In general, 
members of the Board served five-year terms and could not serve more than two consecutive 
terms (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).  
NAMA’s statute required that it prepare and publish online codes of practice that outlined 
various elements of its operations15, which would then be approved (or modified/sent back 
for revision in cases where the Minister did not approve of them) by the Minister for Finance 
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
The EC decision, the National Asset Management Agency 2009 Act, and the regulations put 
forward under said Act subjected NAMA to several forms of additional oversight. While the 
Minister of Finance enjoyed oversight over NAMA through NAMA’s requirement that it issue 
annual statements and accounts to them, the Oireachtas had oversight over NAMA through 
the requirement that NAMA issue periodic reports on its activities and subject itself to 
auditing reports, and by bringing NAMA’s executives before legislative committees (National 
Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
The EC maintained external oversight through the requirements that NAMA report to the EC 
every six months on restructuring plans and the functioning of the program, report to the EC 
and Irish competition authorities each year on the “use of NAMA’s post acquisition powers,” 
and notify the EC of each tranche of assets’ valuation/transfer (Martin 2010). 
NAMA had a mandate to operate “in a transparent manner […] to the extent that to do so 
[was] consistent with the proper and efficient and effective discharge of” its functions 
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA also had to work with 
stakeholders across multiple legal jurisdictions while attempting to secure the best possible 
 
1415 Ireland committed that NAMA would consult with the EC on when it would be appropriate to use its power 
to unilaterally amend contracts (Martin 2010). 
15 Namely, the “conduct of officers of NAMA [(which also defined what constituted misconduct in office)] […] 
servicing standards for acquired bank assets […] [,] risk management, including with regard to debtors […] [,] 
disposal of bank assets […] [,] and any other matter in relation to which the Minister directs NAMA to prepare 
a code of practice” (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
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return for the taxpayer from its assets.16 It tended to follow confidentiality policies similar 
to traditional banking practices and also had to comply with the provisions of the Official 
Secrets Act 1963 (NAMA Annual Report 2010). Its operations reflect this tension. For 
example, a large portion of NAMA’s information was categorized as “confidential 
information” under the NAMA Act and therefore was not available to the public (National 
Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
Coordination with other Programs 
NAMA’s operations were coordinated with two other Irish government programs.  First, 
NAMA was coordinated with a set of capital injections for participating institutions (NAMA 
Business Plan 2009). Second, NAMA coordinated with various social policies by disposing of 
certain properties through sales to “public bodies and […] local authorities or housing 
associations for social housing” (NAMA Progress Report 2014). This was under its mandate 
“to contribute to the social and economic development of the state.” 
Outcomes 
Initial Implementation and Fleshing out the Program (2009-11) 
Five banks ultimately applied for (and were approved for) participation in NAMA: Bank of 
Ireland (BOI), Allied Irish Banks (AIB), Anglo Irish Banking Corporation Ltd (ANGLO), Irish 
Nationwide Building Society (INBS), and Educational Building Society (EBS). All these banks 
were covered by the 2008 blanket guarantee program. During (and after) this application 
period, NAMA conducted due diligence on its largest borrowers, but realized that due 
diligence (and thus the asset purchase process) would take significantly longer than initially 
anticipated. NAMA’s external auditor attributed this delay to problems with the 
documentation quality of NAMA’s participants (NAMA Progress Report 2014). Part of this 
delay also had to do with the EC’s demand that NAMA calculate the haircuts in each tranche 
on a loan-by-loan level, which prompted repeated complaints from Irish officials (Honohan 
2019). 
After obtaining approval from the EC in early 2010, NAMA finally began transferring assets 
(NAMA Progress Report 2014). The process proceeded as follows in Figure 6. 
  
 
16 For examples see cases like SHELBOURNE NORTH WATER STREET CORPORATION v. NATIONAL ASSET 
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, et al. 
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Figure 6: Tranche Data   
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Purchase 







































Sources: European Commission State Aid Decisions Cases 
N725/2009, N331/2010, N529/2010, and 2014/N. 
  
Certain notable borrowers began litigation against NAMA almost immediately after the 
NAMA Act passed (Connolly 2017). Some developers contested NAMA’s attempts to acquire 
assets that were arguably performing (Supreme Court of Ireland 2010). This and other 
disputes resulted in instances of civil litigation during that time (Connolly 2017). 
The property development market suffered through twelve months of uncertainty about the 
rollout and direction of NAMA. There was “a complete lack of liquidity” and industries 
related to property development “absolutely stopped” from NAMA’s April 7, 2009 
announcement until the first transfers of assets began in late March 2010. A number of 
property developers appeared not to know what the impact of NAMA on the property market 
would be (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016; Oliver and O’Hora 2010). 
In mid-2010, data from the first tranche of assets indicated that NAMA’s assumptions (as 
well as estimates provided by banks to NAMA) related to loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and 
income producing loans continued to be overly optimistic (NAMA Business Plan 2010).  
As NAMA had grappled with larger than expected haircuts and non-performing loans in May 
2010, the Head of Treasury17 presented a paper stating that “in the short-term, up to October 
2010, NAMA was likely to require additional funding of up to €250 million” and accordingly 
recommended that NAMA adopt an additional funding strategy. Upon receiving a suggestion 
from the Head of Treasury, NAMA resolved its short-term funding problems by requesting 
 
17 The Head of Treasury was one of NAMA’s executives at the time. 
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that the Minister for Finance approve a €250 million loan from the Central Fund. This loan 
would be used “to create a [temporary] liquidity buffer” until NAMA implemented more 
long-term funding strategies. The Head of Treasury suggested that NAMA achieve this 
through two borrowing programs that would each net a maximum of €2.5 billion for 
NAMA.18 One program, called the ECP programme, would issue Euro Commercial Paper 
(ECP) with maturities of less than one year to help fund a liquidity buffer. The other program, 
to be called the Euro Medium Term Note (EMTN), would issue Euro Commercial Paper with 
one to two year maturities to finance various NAMA projects (NAMA Acquisition of Bank 
Assets 2010). However, NAMA did not end up issuing any paper under these programs and 
repaid its €250 million loan from the Central Fund on October 27, 2010. This was because 
NAMA was able to build up enough operating funds and revenues (NAMA Annual Report 
2010). 
The larger than expected haircuts dealt a blow to confidence in Irish banks, as the banks’ 
new capital requirements were premised on the assumption that the haircuts for later 
tranches would be similar to those of Tranche 1. The markets realized that the banks were 
undercapitalized and the Irish government did not have much fiscal room. From May, Irish 
sovereign bond spreads steadily climbed (See Figure 2). In an effort to salvage the situation, 
officials sought and obtained clearance for a more simplified valuation procedure that would 
allow NAMA to announce the haircuts for the remainder of its purchases by September 
(Honohan 2019). 
NAMA responded to these problems with the release of its first official business plan on June 
30, 2010. This June 30 plan set down new projections based on multiple scenarios and relied 
on less optimistic (taking the first tranche to be representative of NAMA’s remaining assets) 
assumptions about the quality of NAMA’s assets. This plan also made a number of changes 
to NAMA’s operations and elaborated several of its existing policies. These pointed to the 
organization’s efforts to adjust to the less optimistic environment while mitigating its 
reputational risks (see below). Overall, these tended to make NAMA more directly involved 
in the restructuring process and the underlying management of real estate (NAMA Business 
Plan 2010; NAMA Management of Loans 2012).   
The 2010 Business Plan included the following operational changes, that is, reversals of 
existing policies or wholly new policies. First, NAMA indicated that it would only manage the 
largest 100 debtors directly, but did not discount the possibility of adding to that number 
(NAMA Business Plan 2010). NAMA decided that it would acquire its participants’ €14 billion 
in derivatives associated with its acquired loans (which primarily took the form of interest 
rate swaps and were mostly owned by the already nationalized Anglo Irish Bank), a 
substantial number of which were non-performing, for €0 (Clerkin 2010; NAMA Annual 
Report 2011; NAMA Business Plan 2010; Foxe 2018).19 NAMA also noted that it would 
exclusively offer certain properties to public sector bodies at its independently appraised 
“minimum reserve price” for four weeks (“subject to a definite decision, contract and closing 
 
18 This €2.5 billion was half of NAMA’s statutory limit of €5 billion for other borrowings. 
19 However, there does not seem to be enough information to decisively conclude why NAMA paid nothing for 
these derivatives.   
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period of 90 days”) before accepting offers from the larger market.20 NAMA’s Board also set 
targets for paying down NAMA’s debt fully by 2019,21 in line with its goal of collecting funds 
owed by all debtors “to the greatest extent feasible.” Additionally, NAMA would advance 
additional funds to debtors on a risk adjusted basis as needed “to preserve or enhance 
property or complete developments which make economic sense” (NAMA Business Plan 
2010).  
NAMA put forward several policies one might associate with moral hazard reduction. It 
resolved to foreclose on debtors that “are not in a position to service their debts and are not 
considered to be viable in the context of the debtor business plan process”. NAMA also 
declared it would only collaborate with debtors that were being “realistic in terms of asset 
funding and of the lifestyle implications for them of NAMA support.” These debtors would 
also have to accept “close monitoring” by NAMA if collaboration were to be successful 
(NAMA Business Plan 2010). 
Ireland runs out of fiscal space 
In July, NAMA started completing and releasing haircuts for its remaining tranches, which 
later became known as the “bulk tranche.” This did not stop the rising sovereign bond 
spreads and the outflows of deposits. The sovereign-bank doom loop intensified in August 
and September as banks drew more and more funding from the central banking system. On 
November 4, the government began communications with the IMF; on November 14 the 
government started talks with the EC. The Irish government asked for bail-out funding from 
the Troika in December 2010 (Honohan 2019). 
NAMA Begins Asset Management, Restructuring, and Disposal Operations 
By the end of December 2010 NAMA had already sold around €400 million in assets, but 
recorded an overall loss of €1.2 billion since its establishment. As NAMA implemented its 
June 30, 2010 Business Plan, the debtor business plan process was changed to result in 
agreements with NAMA where the debtor would commit to reduce its debt by 25% by 2013. 
Under these agreements, debtors would also commit to adhere to “a schedule of additional 
repayments at various stages over a period of up to eight years.” In return, NAMA would help 
the business restructure the debt into three different loans22, sometimes containing profit-
sharing provisions tied to the business plan’s various milestones” (NAMA Annual Report 
2010). 
 
20 The “minimum reserve price,” is a term of art in the Irish real estate market defined as “the lowest price that 
the vendor is prepared to accept for the property” was a determined through an independent appraisal (See 
NAMA Business Plan 2010 and A word to the wise, September 22, 2011, The Irish Times, Pat Igoe, 
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/homes-and-property/a-word-to-the-wise-1.606309) 
21 25% paid by 2013, 40% paid by 2015, 80% paid by 2017, 95% paid by 2018, and 100% paid by 2019. 
22 The first of these loans would be an interest-bearing debt bearing an interest rate of the six month Euribor 
plus 2.5%. The second of these would be a "non-interest bearing debt […] with a back-end fee of up to 25% 
payable to NAMA.”  The third of these would be debt bearing an interest rate of "up to 4%" above Euribor" 
arising from “new loans advanced for working capital and capital expenditure" (See NAMA Annual Report 
2010). 
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In 2011, asset sales related to NAMA began to accelerate (see Figure 7). There was €3.6 
billion in asset sales, NAMA began to report a yearly profit, and NAMA redeemed €1.3 billion 
of its senior bonds (NAMA Annual Report 2012). The organization conducted due diligence 
on the vast majority of the assets it had acquired. It began intensifying its efforts to assess 
debtor business plans, a stepping stone on the way to asset management and disposal 
(NAMA Annual Report 2011). NAMA finished valuing its assets in March 2012 (NAMA 
Progress Report 2014). 
Figure 7: Comparing the Disposal Rate of Three Western European Bad Banks  
  
Source: Moody’s Investors Service 2015. 
As the European economic environment continued to deteriorate in mid-2011, and Ireland 
progressed through an EU-IMF financial assistance program, NAMA began reorganizing its 
operations from a focus on asset acquisition to a focus on asset management and disposal 
(NAMA Annual Report 2012; European Commission 2019). Among the first of NAMA’s 
actions in this process was the decision to begin outlining and implementing terms for selling 
its loans as packages to larger investors (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). 
Asset Management and Disposal Operations (2012 to 2019) 
In March 2012, NAMA revised its business plan again as part of a “reorganisation of 
functions.” The revised plan changed the projected redemption date (the date at which 
NAMA would redeem its senior bonds) from 2019 to 2020. It also decreased the 2014-2016 
debt redemption targets (the amount of senior debt to be repaid over the period) by around 
€3 billion (to €8 billion). Additionally, the new plan changed the €13 billion 2017-2019 debt 
redemption target into a 2017-2020 debt redemption target of around €16 billion.  Under 
the plan, NAMA consolidated several departments into two integrated divisions (the new 
Asset Management and Asset Recovery divisions). NAMA also  added a commitment to 
“recover all State costs over the projected ten-year life of NAMA without recourse to further 
borrowing, meeting all of its future commitments out of its own resources, over the shortest 
possible time span” (NAMA Progress Report 2014; NAMA Annual Report 2012).  
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In April, NAMA decided to revise its enforcement of Section 172 of the NAMA Act (NAMA 
Second Progress Report 2018).  Section 172 prohibited “any interest in property held as 
security for loans acquired by NAMA from being sold back to defaulting debtors, or persons 
acting on behalf of defaulting debtors” (Houses of the Oireachtas 2019). There were 
exceptions to Section 172 for sales by a borrower or receiver and sales of loans (rather than 
sales of property or interests in property).  NAMA provided for other exceptions to it on a 
case-by-case basis when the application of the policy conflicted with NAMA’s goal of 
“achieving the best financial return.” In the following months, NAMA also introduced several 
smaller initiatives focused on providing vendor finance for commercial property and 
deferred payment mortgages for accessible housing (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).  
NAMA was drawn into the collapse of Anglo Irish Bank and INBS in 2013. Between 2009 and 
late 2010, the Irish government realized that the larger than expected haircuts would 
severely damage the participants, some of which the Irish government de facto owned (INBS 
and Anglo Irish Bank) as a result of capital injections. In the case of INBS, first tranche 
discounts of up to 70% depleted the bank’s regulatory capital, forcing the government to 
state “publicly that it did not have a future as a stand-alone entity ” (Murphy 2013).  Anglo 
and INBS23 were then forced to merge to become the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation 
(IBRC) following a July 1, 2011 order from the High Court requested by the Minister for 
Finance (Central Bank of Ireland 2015).  IBRC continued its business until February 7, 2013, 
when the Irish government implemented the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Act 2013.24 
Under this act, IBRC entered special liquidation (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016; Oireachtas Inquiry 
2016a). The government decided that NAMA would receive any commercial and residential 
loans that “remained unsold after the special liquidators had completed a loan valuation and 
sales process”. The Minister for Finance then facilitated this by ordering NAMA to use 
National Asset Resolution Limited (NARL), NAMA’s newly created subsidiary, to extend a 
loan to IBRC from the Central Bank of Ireland. This loan had been secured by a “floating 
charge over certain IBRC assets.” NAMA paid for this facility by issuing €12.9 billion in 
government guaranteed bonds via a subsidiary and subsequently supported this 
arrangement by providing the Special Liquidator with a working capital lending facility. 
However, by April 2014 the Special Liquidators announced that they were able to generate 
enough revenue from their asset sales to pay its debt to NAMA; the Special Liquidators fully 
repaid the debt on October 21, 2014 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).25  No IBRC assets 
were ultimately transferred to NAMA. 
At some point in this period, NAMA finished disposing of most of its non-Irish assets (See 
Figure 10 and Figure 11). An audit report noted that “NAMA's principal focus from 2014 to 
2020 will be in [the Republic of] Ireland, where it has projected that almost 60% of property 
disposal receipts will arise” (NAMA Progress Report 2014).  NAMA had accelerated its asset 
disposal timeline, adjusting its “internal targets for cash generation and debt redemption” 
accordingly (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). During this process, NAMA packaged and 
sold a number of its loans related to property outside of the Republic of Ireland, largely in 
 
23 Both banks already been nationalized and were moving toward resolution (See Figure 8). 
24 Which was signed by the President on February 7, 2013 (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016a) 
25 NARL earned NAMA €164 million in profit during its operations  
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Britain. One package associated with NAMA’s remaining loans in Northern Ireland that was 
sold in 2014, Project Eagle, accounted for most of NAMA’s losses in 2014 (in which NAMA 
itself made a loss) (C&AG 2016).  Various political figures soon began to make allegations of 
corruption related to Project Eagle, triggering parliamentary inquiries into NAMA’s strategy 
as well as value achieved. The allegations also triggered criminal investigations of some of 
the purchasers of NAMA assets (BBC 2015; Brennan 2018).  
In spite of this, NAMA first became profitable (after impairment charges and taxes) in 2011, 
broke even (in the aggregate) near the end of 2014, and started rapidly accumulating gains 
through 2018 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). 
Overall Outcomes 
NAMA purchased 90% of the assets that it initially identified as eligible (over 12,000 loans 
from 780 “debtor connections” ) between the beginning of its operations and March 2012 
(NAMA Progress Report 2014; NAMA Section 227 Review 2014). These assets had a face 
value of €74.4 billion, representing over 40% of Ireland’s GDP and 9.3% of Ireland’s banking 
assets. The 10% of eligible assets that NAMA ultimately did not purchase had a face value of 
around €9.2 billion (Cas and Peresa 2016; NAMA Progress Report 2014).26 For the eligible 
assets that it did purchase, NAMA paid €31.8 billion in consideration to its five participating 
banks (€30.2 billion in State-guaranteed senior bonds and €1.6 billion in subordinated 
bonds) across two distinct tranches and one “bulk” tranche (Figure 6) resulting in realized 
losses of €42.6 billion or 57% of the face value of the assets transferred, and motivating the 
Irish government to shore up bank balance sheets with significant capital injections in 2010-
11 (NAMA Progress Report 2014; Cussen and Lucey 2011).27 Although NAMA conducted 
some asset sales as early as 2010, NAMA did not accelerate its asset sale operations until 
2011. In 2011, the organization completed €3.6 billion in asset sales, began to report a yearly 
profit, and redeemed €1.25 billion of its senior bonds (NAMA Annual Report 2012).  
NAMA revised its policy on how many of its 780 borrowers would be managed directly 
multiple times, increasing the number from 100 (NAMA Business Plan 2010) to somewhere 
between 180 and 210 from 2010 until 2014 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018; NAMA 
Annual Report 2010; NAMA Annual Report 2011).  In late 2015, NAMA decided to manage 
all of its borrowers directly, after it conducted loan sales that “significantly reduced the 
number of debtor connections” (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). Alongside this 
change, NAMA moved away from its policy of aggressively pursuing debtors through asset 
searches and multi-jurisdictional court cases. For example, one journalist said that “The 
government had promised that Nama would pursue debtors to “the ends of the earth.” This 
 
26 NAMA’s decision for €2.6 billion of these was due to “a number of factors including the scale of debtors’ 
exposure to land and development relative to their total exposure” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2015). NAMA decided 
not to acquire the other €6.6 billion because of a government decision to “not acquire loans from Allied Irish 
Banks and Bank of Ireland where a borrower’s total exposure was less than €20 million” (NAMA Progress 
Report 2014). 
27 In 2010, the Irish government injected €25.3 billion into Anglo Irish Bank, €3.7 billion into AIB, €5.4 billion 
into INBS, €0.875 billion into EBS; nationalized EBS as well as INBS; and restructured ANGLO and INBS (Cussen 
and Lucey 2011). 
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journalist later recalled that “in 2017 Michael Noonan, then finance minister, said that the 
chance of the state recovering the full €74 billion owed on the loans was “lost in the financial 
crisis” (O’Donoghue 2019).   
NAMA also advanced €3.3 billion for capital expenditure in the land and development sector 
from its establishment through 2018 (NAMA Annual Report 2018). On October 13, 2017, 
NAMA redeemed the last of its senior debt and announced that it “expected to redeem €1.6 
billion of subordinated debt by its first call date in March 2020” (End of Year Review 2018; 
NAMA 2017). By the end of 2018, NAMA generated approximately €44 billion in funds from 
its assets, had €2.3 billion in remaining assets, and was projecting that it would return over 
€4 billion in profit to the taxpayers by the end of its life (Humphries 2019; NAMA Annual 
Report 2018; End of Year Review 2018).  
NAMA’s staff grew from just over 100 employees in 2010 to 370 by year-end 2014. By the 
end of 2016, NAMA had approximately 300 employees, with a goal to further reduce staff in 
connection with a wind-down strategy and redundancy scheme introduced by NAMA in 
2015 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018; NAMA Section 53 Statement for 2019 2018). 
Even after NPLs were transferred to NAMA, Ireland’s NPLs as a percentage of gross loans in 
the banking sector continued to increase. The NPL ratio peaked at 31.8% or €85.3 billion 
only in Q4 2013, more than two years after loans were transferred to NAMA (Sibley 2017).  
NAMA reckoned with competing mandates that became more visible as “an acute shortage 
of [housing] supply […] occurred in many areas throughout the country” (NAMA 2015; 
Kennedy, Gerard, and Stuart 2016).  It began emphasizing its housing programs in 2016. 
NAMA developed affordable housing on some of its property by matching residential stock 
held by NAMA debtors and receivers with local social housing authorities  . It also purchased 
properties from NAMA debtors and receivers, then providing a long-term lease to the 
relevant housing authorities (NAMA 2016). This emphasis accelerated in the following year. 
Media stated that this was because NAMA had decided “the disposal of assets would be a less 
prominent part of its activities in 2017 because of the progress it had made in reducing its 
portfolio.” From this point, NAMA’s largest department was its “residential delivery unit” and 
the organization committed to delivering 20,000 residential housing units by the end of 2020 
(O’Dwyer 2016).  By 2017, the Ireland’s Prime Minister was “examining the possibility of 
repurposing Nama to develop lands on behalf of the state, to step in where the private sector 
has failed” amid a “chronic shortage of homes and property prices again rising rapidly” 
(Beesley 2017).  Eventually, in early 2018, the Irish government established Home Building 
Finance Ireland (HBFI), which would help finance the construction of new homes from a 
$750 million Ministry of Finance fund. Staff seconded from NAMA would help the new 
organization meet its administrative burdens (Bray 2018). 
In December 2015, in response to NAMA’s pivot toward housing programs, five Irish 
property developers lodged a complaint with the European Commission alleging that Ireland 
has granted unlawful State aid to and through the operation of NAMA.  The developers 
alleged that the “alleged State guarantee and the alleged extraordinary post-acquisition 
powers granted to NAMA, as well as the alleged tax exemptions of NAMA” constituted new 
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and/or unlawful aid. They also asserted that “alleged aid to real estate developers […], access 
to confidential information […], relationships of NAMA with local authorities and 
government departments, and […] indirect acquisitions of land at steep discounts by NAMA” 
constituted state aid under Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). The European Commission responded with a January 25, 2018, ruling that the 
measures addressed by the first set of allegations were “existing” and thus did “not constitute 
new nor unlawful aid.” The ruling also rejected the developers’ arguments pertaining to 
Article 107(1) of the TFEU (European Commission 2018). 
However, this was not NAMA’s last interaction with the European Commission over state aid 
issues. In late 2018 NAMA’s Board determined that it was “likely that the Agency will still 
retain a small number of residual loans by the end of its expected end date of 2021.” This 
was reportedly because the loans in question were either “subject to ongoing legal actions” 
or were “secured by residential development sites that have the potential to deliver a 
significant value uplift beyond 2021.”28 The Minister for Finance recommended that NAMA 
continue its operations “for a limited period in order to manage out the residual loans so as 
to optimise their value,” extending NAMA’s lifetime (Section 227 Review 2019). A formal 
notification was sent to to the European Commission on June 20, 2019 that requested 
NAMA’s lifespan be extended “beyond 2021 to the end of December 2025.” In its response, 
the EC determined that it would not “raise objections to the new aid on the grounds that it is 
compatible with the internal market pursuant to Article 107(3)(b)” of the TFEU. Ireland 
attempted to assure the EC that NAMA would “continue not having a distortive effect on the 
market” and thus proposed to make the following commitments regarding “its powers and 
activities in the period beyond 2021” (European Commission 2019): 
● NAMA would not alter or expand its mandate. 
● NAMA would dispose of “its residual residential loans before the end of December 
2025” and “be dissolved by that date subject to outstanding litigation.” 
● Ireland would “not introduce any changes to the NAMA Act 2009 which requires 
NAMA to act commercially and deal expeditiously with the remaining assets while 
protecting or otherwise enhancing the value of those assets in the interests of the 
State.” 
● NAMA would “not provide new development funding for its remaining assets for the 
period beyond end December 2021.” 
● NAMA would “continue to act as a Market Economy Operator with regard to the 
management and disposal of its post-2021 residual portfolio.”’ 
● Ireland would “continue to submit yearly reports on the use of certain powers under 
the NAMA Act 2009 to the EU Commission and the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission, as provided for in paragraph 74(vii) of the 2010 Decision.” 
 
28 NAMA’s assets related to the various housing programs would have conceivably been in the latter category. 
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● Ireland “would submit an annual report to the EU Commission providing an update 
on the progress that NAMA has made towards deleveraging its residual portfolio […] 
every year from 2021 until NAMA’s dissolution.” 
● NAMA and Ireland would not “issue any additional State guaranteed NAMA bonds” 
(European Commission 2019,). 
● On July 26, 2019, the Minister for Finance stated that NAMA can remain operating 
through 2025, extending it from 2021 as previously projected (O'Halloran 2019) 
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II. . Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: NAMA was coordinated with several rounds of capital injections 
and stress tests, but was not announced alongside these activities. 
The announcement and creation of NAMA in 2009 did not initially appear to be coordinated 
with other programs. By the time that NAMA was established, the government had 
nationalized ANGLO and also injected capital into ANGLO, AIB, and BOI (Cussen and Lucey 
2011) (See Figure 8).   
However, the Central Bank of Ireland knew that its March 2010 stress test would reveal 
significant losses. The stress test, known as the Prudential Capital Assessment Review 
(PCAR), projected the capital each bank would need by the end of 2012 to meet regulatory 
capital requirements (Honohan 2015; Honohan 2012; Honohan 2010; NAMA Frequently 
Asked Questions 2009, 10-11). This would theoretically make transparent to the public the 
size of banks’ losses. Based on the haircuts, the banks would raise more capital (via 
government capital injections or via the private sector).  
However, the haircuts that came with NAMA’s asset valuations and purchases were larger 
than those projected by the stress tests, creating further uncertainty (Honohan 2015; 
Honohan 2012; Honohan 2010; NAMA Frequently Asked Questions 2009). NAMA was 
originally expected to cement confidence in the stress test projections and create market 
certainty as to the health of Ireland’s banks. These larger than expected haircuts did the 
opposite. Responding to the larger-than-expected haircuts problem, policymakers in 2010 
injected at least €23 billion into Anglo Irish Bank, €0.35 billion into EBS, €2.3 billion into 
INBS, and €3.7 billion into Allied Irish Banks (See Figure 8). They hoped that the new capital 
could fill the larger-than-expected capital holes exposed by NAMA (Cussen and Lucey 2011, 
83). The government had enough money on hand to fill the holes projected by the stress 
tests, but not the larger-than-expected ones exposed by NAMA. Therefore, the government 
had to seek a program from the troika (Honohan 2019). 
It is also important to note that these capital injections were not required for these domestic 
banks to participate in NAMA. Nor was participation in NAMA required for banks to be 
recapitalized (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). However, 
recapitalization was certainly mandatory for the participating banks because of their 
performance in the stress tests (Honohan 2015; Honohan 2012; Honohan 2010; NAMA 
Frequently Asked Questions 2009). For foreign-owned banks in Ireland, the government 
requested that they be recapitalized using funds from their parent companies before 
requesting funding from the government for recapitalization (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
That being said, none of the foreign-owned banks in Ireland requested government funding 









Figure 8: Major Irish Government Actions in the Banking Sector (2008-2010)  
Pre-Establishment of NAMA  Within a year of the establishment of NAMA 
Date Action Date  Action 
2008-09-30 €352 billion blanket guarantee 2010-03-31 
 
INBS capital injection (€100 
million) 
INBS capital injection (€2.6 billion) 
Nationalization of INBS 
2010-05-28 Effective nationalization of EBS 
EBS capital injection (€100 million) 
2010-05-31 ANGLO capital injection (€8.3 
billion in capital and €2 billion in 
contingent capital) 
2009-01-15 Nationalization of ANGLO 2010-06-00 
 
 
EBS capital injection (€250 million) 
 
Restructuring (eventual merger) of 




ANGLO capital injection (€8.58 
billion) 
 
2009-02-11 BOI capital injection (€3.5 billion)  
AIB capital injection (€3.5 billion)  
2009-06-29 ANGLO capital injection (€3.0 
billion) 
2009-08-06 ANGLO capital injection (€0.8 
billion) 
2010-12-23 AIB capital injection (€3.7 billion) 
2009-09-25 ANGLO capital injection (€0.2 
billion) 
2010-12-00 ANGLO capital injection (€1.474 
billion) 
ANGLO capital injection (€4.946 
billion) 
 
Source: Cussen and Lucey 2011; Central Bank of Ireland, 2011; Department of Finance 2009; Honohan 
2012; Homar 2016; Palcic and Reeves 2011. 
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2. Legal Authority: The Republic of Ireland gave NAMA extensive legal authority using 
the NAMA Act.  
After the April 7, 2009, announcement of NAMA, the government drafted the NAMA Act to 
grant NAMA any authority “necessary for, or incidental to, the achievement of its purposes 
and the performance of its functions.” The government introduced a draft version of the 
NAMA Bill on July 30, 2009, which was revised and eventually became the NAMA Act when 
the Taoiseach (Ireland’s prime minister) signed it into law on November 22, 2009, in spite 
of substantial public opposition (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009).  
3. Legal Authority: The Republic of Ireland structured the NAMA Act to comply with 
European Commission rules and obtained approval for NAMA’s operations at 
multiple points. 
The NAMA Act had to comply with European state aid rules (Cahill and O’Donnell 2010). 
NAMA would constitute state aid. Therefore, NAMA could only be compatible with the EU’s 
internal market if it met the criteria for EC state aid rules for asset relief measures. These 
criteria were established in the Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of 
Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector of February 25, 2009 (better known as the 
Impaired Asset Communication and the IAC) (Communication from the Commission 2009; 
Cas and Peresa 2016).   
These criteria pertained to the following aspects of the program: 
● “Transparency and disclosure requirements;” 
● “burden sharing between the State, shareholders and creditors;” 
● “aligning incentives for beneficiaries with public policy objectives;” 
● “principles for designing asset-relief measures in terms of eligibility, valuation and 
management of impaired assets;” and 
● “the relationship between asset relief, other government support measures and the 
restructuring of banks” (Communication from the Commission 2009). 
The EC found NAMA to be consistent with State aid criteria. The EC approved the 
establishment of NAMA on February 26, 2010. It then required NAMA to submit each of 
NAMA’s asset transfers (and the corresponding valuation) to the EC for review (Cas and 
Peresa 2016; Martin 2010). 
4. Special Powers: NAMA possessed numerous powers and immunities in Ireland’s 
legal system, but the European Commission significantly restricted their use. 
NAMA was seen as having a broad legal mandate (Cas and Peresa 2016). The Minister for 
Finance also buttressed NAMA’s authority with a bevy of statutory amendments between 
2009 and 2013 (NAMA Amendments 2019). As a result, NAMA was protected from a variety 
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of types of liability and had special rights during legal proceedings, reflecting policymakers’ 
concern that “litigation might hinder the achievement of NAMA’s objectives” (Carroll and 
Dodd 2012; National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018) 
These rights and protections included, but were not limited to the following examples: 
● If an asset acquired by NAMA were secured by a charge, then NAMA could redeem or 
discharge any charges on an acquired asset that were senior to NAMA’s, rendering 
NAMA the senior creditor (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 
2018); 
● NAMA could void certain transactions that “hinder the acquisition or impair the value 
of an eligible bank asset”; 
● For certain claims, the NAMA Act restricted the remedies available for damages and 
also restricted the power of the courts to “grant injunctive relief”; 
● NAMA could join certain legal proceedings “in lieu of or in addition to” the 
participating banks (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
NAMA also had the power to issue directions to participating institutions to deal with any 
unacquired portion of an asset that NAMA had acquired from said institution in any way 
specified by NAMA. Participating institutions were required to obey these directions and 
“dealing with” could mean the participant giving NAMA title to an asset in situations where 
NAMA acquired a derivative that captured the proceeds of said asset (National Asset 
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018).  
NAMA had the power to access information on its borrowers from tax authorities as well as 
any necessary information on its acquired assets from the government’s Land Registry 
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018; Cerruti and Neyens 2016). The 
NAMA Act provided NAMA with the “compulsory right of purchase”, the right to petition the 
Court for vesting orders, and the ability to appoint a statutory receiver to a participant’s 
assets (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). All three of these powers allowed NAMA to increase its 
control over the relevant asset (and potentially its underlying property) (Property 
Registration Authority 2014). The first two of these powers aimed to help NAMA in its effort 
to avoid fire sales. The compulsory right of purchase was similar to the eminent domain 
powers enjoyed by authorities in the United States; it made it less costly in time and money 
to acquire distressed assets. The vesting order right made it possible for NAMA to convert 
its security interest in underlying collateral into outright ownership (Carroll and Dodd 2012; 
McNulty 1912). As part of EC state aid proceedings, Ireland committed to consult with the 
EC before using its “compulsory right of purchase” power; however, it did not need to consult 
with the EC in situations involving ransom strips of land—that is, land needed to access an 
adjacent property from a public highway (Martin 2010). The EC also required the Irish 
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authorities to commit that NAMA wouldn’t use its vesting order power in the context of a 
syndicated loan without the agreement of the other syndicate members.29 
The power to appoint a statutory receiver allowed NAMA to appoint a receiver to take 
possession of the collateral securing its assets; this was an unprecedented power within Irish 
creditor-debtor law. This power became NAMA’s favored tool for pursuing uncooperative 
debtors (Carroll and Dodd 2012). According to NAMA officials, NAMA needed this power 
because Irish insolvency law at the time was extremely outdated; bankruptcy under existing 
laws could take as long as 12 years. Legislators were already debating bankruptcy reforms 
that included features like the power to appoint a statutory receiver. While these reforms 
would not happen until 2012, some of the features made their way into the NAMA Act 2009 
(Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 
2021). 
5. Mandate: NAMA technically had numerous mandates outlined under the NAMA Act, 
but the primary one was achieving the best financial return for the government 
NAMA’s initial mandate was to realize the aims of the NAMA Act by acquiring eligible bank 
assets from participating institutions, “as is appropriate,” dealing with such acquired assets 
“expeditiously,” and enhancing or protecting the value of the assets in the interest of the 
government (gov.ie 2019). To this end, NAMA’s commercial mandate was to obtain the best 
achievable financial return for the government, taking the three following parameters into 
account: (1) The amount of money the Irish government paid to acquire and manage the 
assets, (2) NAMA’s cost of capital and operating costs, and (3) any other factor that NAMA 
thinks is relevant to realizing its purpose (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, 
Revised 2018). 
NAMA’s mandate did evolve over time. As Ireland’s economic health deteriorated in the 
second half of 2010, NAMA began to emphasize its role in the restructuring of the banking 
system (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). After NAMA’s asset disposals then 
accelerated and its portfolio shrank, NAMA’s mandate gradually shifted to one focused on 
the development of affordable housing in Ireland (Dodd 2012; O’Dwyer 2016; NAMA 
Progress Report 2014). This related to one of the aims of the NAMA Act, which was to 
“contribute to the social and economic development of the state” (Susan McDermott and 
Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 2021).  
6. Communication: NAMA had a public relations strategy and message but faced 
limitations in its efforts to be perceived by the public as transparent.  
NAMA officials appeared on radio programs to explain the organization’s activities and 
supplied anonymous as well as official information to newspapers (Carswell 2010; Irish 
Independent 2012).30 NAMA did not have a constituency in the banking or property 
 
29 The EC asked Ireland to restrict NAMA’s use of several other powers that it understood to be “potentially 
more distortive” of competition (Martin 2010). 
30 NAMA officials were bound by a Code of Conduct and by the Official Secrets Act 1963 that kept them from 
providing confidential information through external sources (NAMA Annual Report 2010). 
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development industry, with its Chairman stating in the 2010 Annual Report that “I do not 
believe that any other State Agency has come into being with a potential client base—those 
in banking and property development—whose enthusiasm for it was so lukewarm” (NAMA 
Annual Report 2010). 
According to NAMA officials, the organization’s messaging evolved as the institution’s work 
evolved. When NAMA was first proposed, the Irish government did not promote NAMA as a 
guaranteed cure for the economy’s woes and very much presented the NAMA scheme as a 
work in progress. Government officials communicated that the potentially large (and 
uncertain) cost of NAMA’s purchases and the make-up of Ireland’s sovereign bond holders 
could have negative impact on Ireland’s fiscal situation. However, it seemed to hedge those 
concerns by stating that “The income streams from the NAMA assets will mitigate the cost to 
the Exchequer of servicing the additional debt and the proceeds from their eventual sale will 
accrue to NAMA and the Exchequer (Houses of the Oireachtas May 2009).”  
Several other key themes echoed throughout NAMA’s communications. One was that NAMA 
was not a bailout for developers or a bad bank. Government statements referred to NAMA as 
an “asset management agency” rather than as a “bad bank,” with the Taoiseach claiming that 
NAMA “is not a bad bank model […] because it obviously takes in all loans, including 
performing loans.” The word “bailout” only seemed to appear when NAMA was being 
discussed in the Oireachtas or in simplified NAMA documents (which may have been aimed 
at the general public) like the three-page “The National Asset Management Agency: A Brief 
Guide” (NAMA Brief Guide 2010; Houses of the Oireachtas May 2009a).  
From 2013, as NAMA’s asset sales accelerated, messaging shifted toward emphasizing the 
organization’s ability to meet its strategic objectives (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of 
NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 2021). Around this time, NAMA started 
talking more about its social and economic contributions. NAMA’s focus on its social and 
economic contributions became more dominant as the organization took on more of a role 
as a housing developer in the mid-to-late 2010s (Dodd 2012; O’Dwyer 2016). 
Although NAMA publicly emphasized its commitment to transparency early on in its life, 
references to transparency (beyond transparency in its procurement process) in official 
communications were less common in annual reports released after 2010 (NAMA Annual 
Report 2010; NAMA Annual Report 2012; NAMA Annual Report 2013; NAMA Annual Report 
2018). That being said, NAMA states that it has been fully transparent within the constraints 
put on it by Irish laws and confidentiality rules (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of 
NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, February 26, 2021). 
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Another theme in NAMA’s communications is best expressed by the statement “NAMA is not 
the problem, it is merely cleaning up a problem that was created by others.” Officials tended 
to describe what NAMA would do using nonfinancial terms like “cleansing” and 
“crystallising” losses. NAMA would act in a commercial manner, but would not hesitate to 
put pressure on the banks and borrowers. For example, NAMA asserted that it would only 
be providing funding to developers “where it will make commercial sense” and criticized the 
banks by stating that NAMA’s operations had “revealed a troubling picture of poor loan 
documentation, of assets not properly legally secured and of inadequate stress-testing of 
borrowers and loans—all born of a mindless scramble to funnel lending into one sector at 
considerable pace and of a reckless abandonment of basic principles of credit risk and 
prudent lending” (McDonagh 2010). 
7. Ownership Structure: The government of Ireland created NAMA as a majority 
private-owned entity because of concerns about placing additional contingent 
liabilities on the government balance sheet.  
If NAMA’s assets ended up on the government’s balance sheet some policymakers believed 
that there would be an increased possibility that “Irish […] [deficit] levels could be artificially 
distorted as a result of loan foreclosures” on loans with collateral located in Ireland. Eurostat 
regulations mandated that NAMA’s assets needed to have majority private ownership to not 
be on the government balance sheet and enjoy a government guarantee at the same time 
(Cussen and Lucey 2011).  
To fulfill this requirement, NAMA conducted most of its operations through an Irish SPV 
created by NAMA called National Asset Management Agency Investment Ltd. (Called 
NAMAIL or the Invest Co.). Invest Co. was a public-private partnership with initial capital of 
€100 million.  Three sets of private investors (Irish Life & Permanent, New Ireland Assurance 
(Bank of Ireland Group), and “a group of clients of Allied Irish Banks’ Investment Managers”) 
held a 51% stake and NAMA held a 49% stake with veto power over strategic decisions 
(Martin 2010; Cas and Peresa 2016). Beneath this SPV were three Section 110 SPVs, which 
enjoyed special tax status (allowing for only a nominal tax burden), and two conventional 
Irish SPVs (See Figure 4) (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010; NAMA Second Progress 
Report 2018). NAMA wanted to reduce the tax liability of its subsidiaries because NAMA’s 
exemption from “income tax, corporation tax and capital gains tax” under Section 214 of the 
NAMA Act did not apply to subsidiaries.31 Although the NAMA Act did not allow NAMA itself 
to downstream its own tax-exempt status to its subsidiaries, Irish corporate law, with its 
treatment of Section 110 SPVs, allowed NAMA to decrease its tax burden in line with other 
Irish corporations of the time. 
Invest Co. created (and owned a 100% stake in) a Section 110 SPV called National Asset 
Management Ltd. (also known as the Master SPV). The Master SPV then owned a subsidiary 
Section 110 SPV called National Asset Management Group Services Ltd. (the Intermediate 
Co.). The Intermediate Co. owned three functional subsidiaries: a Section 110 SPV known as 
 
31 Such maneuvers were common in Irish finance at the time, though this would change with legal reforms in 
2016. 
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National Asset Loan Management Ltd. (the Acquirer Co.), a conventional Irish SPV known as 
National Asset Property Management Ltd. (the Property Co.), and a conventional Irish SPV 
known as National Asset Management Services Ltd. (the Management Services Co.) (NAMA 
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).  
Together, the companies functioned as follows: The Acquirer Co. directly received the assets 
that NAMA bought, which included any income from interest on the loans, and initiated 
enforcement proceedings against the borrowers of the loans as needed. As the Acquirer Co. 
could not “carry on any activities ancillary to holding and managing the loans,” it sold the 
properties it acquired to the Property Co. for zero consideration upfront. The Property Co. 
then managed these properties and used its property management profits to pay corporation 
taxes. The Property Co. would eventually dispose of the assets and pay the resulting proceeds 
to the Acquirer Co. as delayed consideration. The Acquirer Co.’s after tax proceeds then 
flowed back up through the other SPVs to the Master SPV, which paid a performance-based 
dividend to Invest Co.’s private investors and then paid any remaining surplus to NAMA. 
Finally, NAMA paid the surplus it received from the Master SPV to the Exchequer (NAMA 
Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010). 
In order to limit the benefits and potential losses for NAMA’s private-sector shareholders, 
NAMA placed a cap on their possible annual return or loss to 10% above or below the yield 
on the 10-year Irish government bond yield, with remaining profits (losses) going to NAMA 
(Braakman and Forster 2011). 
Meanwhile, the Management Services Co. handled the expenses, tax administration, and 
financial operations of these companies (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
This private ownership legal structure was based on a French program called Société de 
Financement de l’Économie Française (SFEF). SFEF used a majority privately owned vehicle 
to issue government guaranteed debts and lend the proceeds to French financial institutions 
in need of liquidity. NAMA chose to follow this structure, because it initially fit well with 
Eurostat accounting guidelines. These guidelines allowed majority-private interventions like 
SFEF and NAMA to avoid being counted as part of the public debt (Cussen and Lucey 2011). 
The Eurostat regulation also required that NAMAIL be “of a temporary duration,” “created 
solely to deal with the financial crisis,” and not be “expected to incur losses” (Cussen and 
Lucey 2011). By 2016, these Eurostat rules changed, placing asset management companies 
like NAMA on the government balance sheet if the company’s funding structure had a 
government guarantee, even if the AMC were privately owned (Cas and Peresa 2016). 
However, it is not clear how much a difference the changed Eurostat rules would have made 
to NAMA’s operations. Ratings companies classified NAMA as part of the Irish sovereign’s 
balance sheet and the Irish government had to enter an EC-IMF program at the end of 2010 
regardless (European Commission 2019a; Cullinan and Beers 2010).  
NAMA’s SPV structure and use of profit participation loan (PPL) agreements initially also 
allowed NAMA to pay almost no taxes. Under such agreements, the Section 110 SPVs would 
pay interest on the PPLs dependent on its profitability. However, due to a number of changes 
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in the tax law in 2016, NAMA restructured the Acquirer Co. into a “regular trading company” 
when the PPL tax deduction was restricted (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). 
8. Governance/Administration: NAMA was structured as a corporation but had 
several features (beyond the government’s control of its board) meant to protect 
the interests of the state and draw on existing resources within the Irish 
government. 
NAMA was structured as a statutory corporation (not a bank) and was governed using a nine-
person Board. The composition of NAMA’s Board was as follows: 
● Seven members appointed by the Minister for Finance 
● Two ex-officio members appointed by the Minister for Finance 
o The CEO of NAMA (appointed by the Minister for Finance in consultation with 
the Chief Executive of the NTMA) 
o The Chief Executive of the NTMA (National Asset Management Agency Act 
2009, Revised 2018) 
Additionally, NAMA was subject to various anti-corruption acts and a number of other anti-
corruption related provisions. The NAMA Act made lobbying NAMA, defined broadly, a legal 
offence (Carroll and Dodd 2012; National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 
2018). This provision also penalized people who believed that they received a 
communication that constituted lobbying under the NAMA Act, but did not report the details 
of the communication to the Garda (police) promptly. The NAMA Act also contained 
provisions that appeared to protect whistle-blowers (National Asset Management Agency 
Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
NAMA was provided with staff, “human resources, IT and market risk analysis” services32 by 
its parent, the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) (Cas and Peresa 2016).33 
NAMA expected to have around 100 employees (Connolly 2017, 1-2), but grew to a size of 
up to 380 employees with specialist skills in property, banking, finance, law, and related 
disciplines (Williams 2014). This number does not include the roughly 500 people at the five 
participating banks who managed NAMA’s €13 billion exposure to smaller debtors (About 
NAMA 2014). For staff and contractors involved in asset management, NAMA drew on “many 
former development companies and former banking interests” (Williams 2014). Until 
around 2014, NAMA’s staff enjoyed bonuses linked to employee performance (Cerruti and 
 
32 Over time, NAMA developed an extensive IT interface that included a public database of “NAMA-related 
properties in receivership in Ireland, Northern Ireland and Great Britain.” (See NAMA Annual Report 2018). 
33 NTMA was “reimbursed by NAMA for the costs of these services.” (See Cas and Peresa 2016). Although the 
NTMA was the organization in charge of issuing and managing Irish government debt, it was not formally part 
of the Ministry of Finance. (See Linehan 2012). As a result, NTMA did not have to be staffed by civil servants 
(although its chief was to be appointed by the Minister for Finance) and could pay its employees a salary that 
was similar to those in the private sector while cutting down the amount of bureaucracy required for decision-
making (as well as hiring). The NTMA was also the institution in charge of managing the national pension fund.  
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Neyens 2016). A change in this policy, and NAMA’s March 2012 reorganization from asset 
purchase and valuation to asset management, caused NAMA to lose critical staff (NAMA 
Annual Report 2012). Anticipating NAMA’s eventual winding-down, NAMA implemented a 
voluntary redundancy program in 2015, which NAMA’s Chief Executive described as “helpful 
to date in stemming the volume of staff departures at a time when an uncontrolled exodus 
would have been seriously damaging to our business.” Nevertheless, NAMA did not appear 
to have remedies for retaining “specialist staff,” which NAMA believed could be easily 
poached by the recovering private sector (NAMA Annual Report 2015). 
Discussions with NAMA staff revealed that though NAMA could pay market rates, its 
positions were largely for contractors (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom 
discussion with author, February 26, 2021). As an organization with a limited lifetime, 
employees could not be certain that these contracts would always be renewed. Therefore, 
some employees started to leave as the market improved, reasoning that NAMA could not 
offer enough job security. 
Figure 9: Administration Expenses and Employee Numbers  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance Section 227 review of NAMA, 2019. 
9. Governance/Administration: NAMA was formally subject to extensive oversight by 
multiple stakeholders. 
NAMA had significant accountability to the Minister for Finance, the Oireachtas, and the EC. 
As for the two former groups, NAMA had to do several things. It had to submit annual reports 
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to the Minister for Finance, keep accounts in a form specified by the Minister for Finance, 
and produce quarterly reports for the Minister for Finance (that would then be passed on to 
the Oireachtas). It also had to produce reports at the behest of the Minister for Finance, 
submit to audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General, and be accountable to the legislative 
Dail Eireann Committee of Public Accounts (PAC) (Carroll and Dodd 2012). NAMA’s 
Chairperson and CEO were required to report to other committees in the Oireachtas that had 
been appointed to “examine matters related to NAMA” (National Asset Management Agency 
Act 2009, Revised 2018). Although NAMA was required to “act in a transparent manner in 
carrying out its functions,” it only had to do so to the extent that it was “consistent with 
proper and efficient and effective discharge” of its functions (Carroll and Dodd 2012). As for 
the EC, NAMA had to report to the EC every six months on its participating banks’ 
restructuring plans and the functioning of the program. NAMA also had to report to EC’s and 
the Republic of Ireland’s competition authorities each year on the “use of NAMA’s post 
acquisition powers” (Martin 2010). 
Operationally, NAMA enjoyed a significant amount of independence because the Minister for 
Finance only appeared to intervene in NAMA on a limited basis (Carroll and Dodd 2012).34 
However, the Minister for Finance was able to control NAMA using several tools. Under the 
NAMA Act, the Minister for Finance could issue binding written guidelines and directions to 
NAMA. NAMA would have to “have regard to any guidelines issued by” the Minister for 
Finance and be required to comply with written directions from the Minister for Finance 
“concerning the achievement of the purposes of this Act” (National Asset Management 
Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). The Minister could also determine which organizations 
could participate in NAMA, which assets would count as eligible assets, and have the final 
say over whether a “particular asset may be acquired.” They also had the final say on the 
“total value of a portfolio of assets to be acquired from a participating institution” in cases 
where the participants filed a dispute with NAMA (Carroll and Dodd 2012).  The structure of 
NAMA’s Board, in which seven of its nine members and NAMA’s CEO were appointed by the 
Minister for Finance, also granted the Minister for Finance a significant amount of power 
over the organization (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
In practice, as of 2019, the Minister for Finance issued six directions and twelve statutory 
instruments under the NAMA Act (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 
2018). The Minister for Finance also issued four directions under the IBRC Act in 2013 
(Carroll and Dodd 2012).  
There were only three events where the Minister for Finance used its powers to issue 
directions and statutory instruments under the NAMA Act to become visibly involved in 
NAMA’s day-to-day operations. The first was when the Minister for Finance put forward two 
statutory instruments and a direction requiring NAMA to expedite its asset acquisition 
process (eliminating the tranche system) (Lenihan 2010; S.I. No. 504 2010; S.I. No. 505 
2010). The others were two operations related to the IBRC; one of the directions under the 
 
34 However, University College Dublin economist Karl Whelan argued that the Minister for Finance strained 
NAMA’s independence when he ordered that NAMA acquire a loan facility between IBRC and the Central Bank 
of Ireland. This order aimed to limit the damage of IBRC’s special liquidation in April 2012 (See NAMA Second 
Progress Report 2018). (See Whelan 2012). 
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NAMA Act and all four directions under the IBRC Act ordered NAMA to support the special 
liquidation of IBRC in various capacities (Legislation).   
10. Size: NAMA did not have a specified size and funded itself, but its size was limited 
by a €54 billion cap on debt securities it could use to purchase assets and a €5 
billion cap on borrowings for other purposes. 
There was no cap on the face value of the assets NAMA would purchase, but the NAMA Act 
allowed the organization to issue up to €54 billion in debt securities for the purchase of 
assets before asking the government for permission to spend additional funds (Carroll and 
Dodd 2012). This number was arrived at by estimating the long-term value of the assets 
expected to be eligible for transfer to NAMA. €47 billion of this figure represented the then-
current market value of the assets. They determined the remaining €7 billion by applying a 
number of statutory uplift factors (related to the expected default rate, the proportion of 
performing loans, etc.) (NAMA Business Plan 2009).  
Ultimately, NAMA spent €31.8 billion to acquire assets with a face value of €74.4 billion. 
11. Funding Source: NAMA was mostly government-funded, using government-
guaranteed debt and loans from the Irish government. 
NAMA ultimately funded its asset purchases by issuing €30.2 billion in state-guaranteed 
senior bonds usable as collateral in the Eurosystem and €1.6 billion in subordinated bonds. 
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan said that the purpose of these subordinated bonds was 
that they “put […] the bank at risk if NAMA were to lose money […] without giving them an 
upside in relation to its gains” (Houses of the Oireachtas September 2009).  
The terms of the senior bonds included (but were not limited to) the following (NAMA 
2011)35:  
● Principal and Interest guaranteed by The Minister for Finance of Ireland 
● Maximum Amount Outstanding: €51,300,000,000 
● Currency: Euro, Sterling, or U.S. Dollars 
● Issue Date: March 26, 2010 (Carroll and Dodd 2012) 
● Maturity: March 1, 2011 (it is uncertain whether all the senior debt would be rolled 
over annually) 
● Interest Rate (paid semi-annually on March 1 and September 1): 
 
35 This information is from the March 1, 2011, circular, but the 2011 issuance was in substantially the same 
form as the 2010 issuance (with exception of the fact that the 2011 issuance “may be physically settled at 
maturity at the option of the Issuer upon not less than 20 business days’ notice to holders by issuing a new Note 
on the same terms as the existing Note,” while the 2010 issuance could be “physically settled at maturity at the 
option of the Issuer upon not less than 10 business days’ notice. (See NAMA 2011.) 
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o For Euro-denominated Notes: six-month Euribor 
o For Dollar-denominated Notes: six-month LIBOR 
o For Sterling-denominated Notes: six-month LIBOR (NAMA 2011) 
The architects of the senior bonds appear not to have anticipated that the six-month Euribor 
rate might decrease to the extent that the bonds bore a negative interest rate. If the notes 
carried a negative interest rate, they could not be used as collateral with the ECB and this 
would therefore make it more difficult for their holders to fulfill “their regulatory liquidity 
requirements.”36 When the six-month Euribor rate declined to 4.9 basis points in late July 
2015, the Minister for Finance began to worry that a negative interest rate was a significant 
possibility. In response, the Minister directed NAMA to “take appropriate steps to ensure 
that in the event that the 6[-]month Euribor is negative a negative rate will not apply to the 
Notes.” He continued, writing that NAMA was “to ensure that these notes remain eligible as 
collateral for Eurosystem monetary policy operations” in so far as was possible (Noonan 
2015). 
The terms of the subordinated bonds included (but were not limited to) the following (NAMA 
2010): 
● Aggregate Nominal Amount and Issue Price: 5% of the total acquisition value of the 
acquired portfolio of each participating institution (€1.6 billion) 
● Currency: Euro 
● Issue Date: March 26, 2010  
● Interest Rate: 10-year Irish Government bonds rate as of March 26, 2010 (the first 
issue date), plus 75 basis points, paid annually starting March 1, 2011, if the Board of 
the Issuer determines the Issuer is “achieving objectives” related to NAMA’s financial 
performance37(Carroll and Dodd 2012; NAMA Annual Report 2018). 
● First Call Date: March 1, 2020  
● Term: Perpetual 
 
36 That being said, negative rates were not a common occurrence, let alone perceived as a likely occurrence 
when these senior bonds were designed (Liu and Anderson 2013). 
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NAMA funded its day-to-day operations through government borrowing and €51 million in 
equity provided by the various private organizations investing in NAMA’s SPV (Martin 2010; 
Cas and Peresa 2016). In practice, NAMA was able to sustain itself using funds generated by 
its operations after it repaid €299 million in loans from the Central Fund by February 2011 
(NAMA Annual Report 2011; McDonagh 2013). NAMA originally expected to issue 
commercial paper, but this proved difficult amidst Ireland’s deteriorating financial 
conditions (Martin 2010; Cas and Peresa 2016).  
12. Funding Source: NAMA possessed a clawback feature that enabled it to tax 
participants to cover any aggregate losses it ultimately suffered.  
NAMA enjoyed a loss-sharing clawback provision under the NAMA Act. Under this provision, 
if NAMA ended up with a loss, NAMA could impose a tax on its participants to make up the 
loss. The EC pointed to this tool as one of NAMA’s two “risk-sharing-mechanisms.” However, 
the feature was controversial during NAMA’s design (Martin 2010). NAMA’s (pre-
establishment) interim CEO Brendan McDonagh and the future Minister for Finance Brian 
Lenihan argued against the measure during debates on Peter Bacon’s initial NAMA proposal. 
According to them, “the appropriate place to impose the levy would be finance legislation 
rather than the NAMA legislation [because] it might have an effect on the valuation of the 
assets to be transferred” as the clawback essentially represented “an unpriced option in 
terms of what the clawback would be in the future” (Houses of the Oireachtas May 2009b). 
Although similar loss-sharing features might have been controversial when put forward in 
other countries, legislators adopted the provision in response to “voters’ anger over the 
rising cost of the bank bailout and simultaneous fiscal tightening,” and the provision ceased 
to be particularly newsworthy soon after (Gumuchian 2010). 
13. Eligible Institutions: Any credit institution could apply to NAMA, but the Minister 
would ultimately decide which applicants were eligible.  
Once NAMA was established (on December 21, 2009) “[a]ny credit institution, including Irish 
subsidiaries of foreign credit institutions,” that wished to participate had 60 days (until 
February 19, 2010) to apply. All five applicants were Irish banks and their subsidiaries that 
were covered by the Irish government’s blanket guarantee (Martin 2010).  NAMA started 
collecting information from some of these banks in mid-2009, as there were already public 
expectations that certain troubled banks (like ANGLO) would apply (NAMA Acquisition of 
Bank Assets 2010).  
Before NAMA began, the government requested that foreign banks subsidiaries in Ireland be 
recapitalized using funds from their parent companies before requesting funding from the 
government; however, this became a moot point because no foreign bank subsidiaries 
applied to participate in NAMA and a similar requirement did not exist for the other domestic 
banks (Cerruti and Neyens 2016).  
Within three months of receiving an application, the Minister, after consultation with the 
Governor of the Central Bank and Regulatory Authority, would determine if an applicant 
could participate based on three factors (Martin 2010; National Asset Management Agency 
Act 2009, Revised 2018): 
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● Systemic importance of the applicant, which was determined using a standardized 
rubric (Martin 2010, 37; NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010); 
● Available Ministry of Finance resources and the financial position of the applicant;  
● Compliance with NAMA Act obligations, which included but what were not limited 
to: 
● Including all of its subsidiaries in its application to the Minister for Finance; 
● Providing any “information, explanation, books, documents and records 
that the Minister” required; 
● Certifying in “utmost good faith […] all matters and circumstances […] that 
might materially affect […] the Minister’s decision” on an institution’s 
application; and 
● Limiting a number of business actions (like dealing with eligible assets 
outside the ordinary course of business) it could take without “prior 
written approval of NAMA” before NAMA acquired the eligible assets 
(National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
Although the initial proposals for an asset management company had recommended that the 
program be mandatory, the government opted for a voluntary approach (National Asset 
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). This was because the various recapitalization 
undertaken by the government had already resulted in significant public ownership of the 
Irish banking system. The government had stakes in ANGLO, AIB, and BOI at the time of 
NAMA’s establishment (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). 
14. Other Conditions: The NAMA Act could allow the Irish government to exercise 
significant control over participating institutions.  
Ireland’s Financial Regulator and the Minister for Finance could require participants to 
produce any such report they considered necessary for monitoring compliance. After 
consultations with the Governor of the Central Bank and the Financial Regulator, the 
Minister for Finance could require participants to produce Restructuring Plans and/or 
business plans by a certain time. With approval from the Minister for Finance, the Financial 
Regulator could also issue directions to participants that would restrict balance sheet 
growth, the ability of participants to conduct mergers or acquisitions, or require balance 
sheet reduction, so long as the purpose of the direction was to achieve the purposes of the 
NAMA Act (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). 
It is important to understand that the Irish government already had significant control over 
the country’s large banks by the time that NAMA began operating. The government had 
significant stakes in all of NAMA’s participants by the end of 2010 (See Figure 8) (Palcic and 
Reeves 2011). 
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15. Eligible Assets: The original act defined eligible assets broadly, but the Minister of 
Finance limited the program to loans and contracts related to development of land 
(Cas and Peresa 2016). 
Any “bank asset” designated by the Minister for Finance was an eligible asset for purchase 
by NAMA. In the NAMA Act, the term could broadly include any “security related to a credit 
facility” as well as any credit facility. But the Minister for Finance ultimately defined eligible 
bank assets more narrowly as “all loans issued for the purchase, exploitation or development 
of land as well as loans either secured or guaranteed by land;” related commercial loans; and 
other financial contracts relating to acquired loans (Martin 2010; NAMA Acquisition of Bank 
Assets 2010; Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). NAMA had full discretion to decide which assets it 
would purchase from participating banks (Carroll and Dodd 2012; NAMA Annual Report 
2018). For efficiency reasons, all transferred loans from AIB, Anglo Irish Bank, and Bank of 
Ireland had to be at least €5 million; NAMA’s Board later increased the figure to €20 million 
for assets held by AIB and Bank of Ireland (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). The government 
expected eligible assets to be highly concentrated among a small number of large real estate 
developers (Martin 2010). 
When NAMA acquired the loans, their breakdown by region and asset type was as follows: 
Figure 10: Property Collateral for NAMA Loans by region and asset type 
  Ireland   Britain  
 Northern 
Ireland  
 Rest of 
World   Total  
 Office              2,666              2,100               215               272              5,253  
 Retail              2,909              1,157               216               145              4,427  
 Other Investment              2,410              1,225               343               504              4,482  
 Residential              3,696              1,289               133               156              5,274  
 Hotels                 934              1,809                 12               282              3,037  
 Total Completed Properties            12,615              7,580               919            1,359            22,473  
 Land              4,174              1,846               279               158              6,457  
 Development              1,129              1,334                 61               327              2,851  
 Total Land and Development             5,303              3,180               340               485              9,308  
 Total            17,918            10,760            1,259            1,844            31,781  
 %                     1                     0                   0                   0   
 
Source: Oireachtas Inquiry 2016, 318.  
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16. Acquisition (Pricing): NAMA had a detailed valuation procedure for its assets that 
sought to determine long-term economic value. 
NAMA’s valuation procedures were intended to clarify the value of its assets while limiting 
the damage that the resulting haircuts would impose on its participants by paying the long 
term economic value for the assets (which would be higher than the current market value) 
(Carroll and Dodd 2012). The Irish government began collecting information for due 
diligence and constructing valuation processes by May 2009, months before the NAMA Act 
passed or NAMA was formally established (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010). The 
NAMA Act allowed for NAMA to purchase assets at the current market value or at any price 
between the current market value and the long-term economic value so long as NAMA 
consulted with the Minister for Finance. However, all of NAMA’s valuations and acquisitions 
ultimately took place at long-term economic value. NAMA defined long-term economic value 
for asset as “the value, as determined by NAMA, that it can reasonably be expected to attain 
in a stable financial system when the crisis conditions prevailing at the passing of the Act are 
ameliorated.”38 It defined long-term economic value for property as “the value, as 
determined by NAMA, that it can reasonably be expected to attain in a stable financial system 
when the crisis conditions prevailing at the passing of the Act are ameliorated and in which 
a future price or yield of the property is consistent with the reasonable expectation having 
regard to the long-term historical average.” NAMA defined the “long-term” as between 
January 1, 1985 and  December 31, 2005, indicating that NAMA placed the Irish property 
market as only having been overvalued starting January 1, 2006 (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
NAMA constructed the long-term economic value by observing the current market value of 
the asset and the assets’ collateral as of November 30, 2009 (rather than the current market 
value at the time of the purchase), applying an uplift factor based on the projected increase 
in the collateral’s value and a discount based on “the extent to which a participating bank has 
secured its legal right to realise the underlying security” to a discounted cash flow (DCF) 
valuation methodology approved by the EC (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).39  
The actual valuation process, which took place loan-by-loan until the Irish government 
received permission from the EC to simplify it in mid to late 2010, was arduous (Honohan 
2019, 219). This was because the EC worried NAMA would be used to provide illegal state 
aid to Irish banks (i.e. that NAMA would inflate valuations to the point where NAMA’s 
purchases worked like a stealth recapitalization) (Honohan 2019). 
 
38 The term asset, rather than loan, is sometimes used because NAMA also acquired some derivatives. 
39 The EC did not specifically require the use of DCF. The 2009 IAC instead merely stated that “the Commission 
would consider a transfer value reflecting the underlying long-term economic value of the assets on the basis 
of underlying cash flows and broader time horizons as an acceptable benchmark indicating compatibility of the 
aid amount as the minimum necessary” (See Martin 2010). Additionally, the EC noted that NAMA’s DCF 
approach and the calculation of long-term economic value was appropriate “to the extent that the discount rate 
and in particular the margin added to the risk-free rate is viewed as adequate” (Martin 2010). 
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17. Acquisition (Pricing): NAMA possessed another clawback feature that enabled it to 
get back any amount it was determined to have overpaid for assets.  
NAMA’s creators integrated a valuation clawback provision (which the 2009 IAC mentioned 
as a potential tactic) (Communication from the Commission 2009) into the organization. If 
NAMA determined that it overpaid for an asset, NAMA could claw back the amount that it 
overpaid from the participants. The NAMA Act also provided for participants to claw back 
value from NAMA in cases of underpayment through a “Valuation Panel” procedure, but it is 
not clear whether these reverse clawbacks were widely used (Martin 2010; National Asset 
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). NAMA would determine that it overpaid by 
way of: 
● EC decisions on proper loan valuation procedures; 
● due diligence conducted after the expedited valuation and purchase of an asset; 
● realization that it had made a mistake in applying its valuation procedures; or  
● the rectification of incorrect (or incomplete) information that NAMA received while 
initially valuing the assets (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
18. Acquisition (Mechanics): NAMA grouped loans by common borrower and sold 
them in tranches.  
Once the panel of loan-value experts arrived at a valuation, NAMA grouped the loans based 
on their shared relationships with a given borrower (rather than by bank) and sorted them 
into tranches for transfer. Each additional tranche contained a larger number of borrowers 
and smaller positions (the author of this piece hypothesizes that NAMA’s designers carved 
up the assets into tranches because they anticipated that the scale of documentation 
processing required to value all of the assets at once dramatically outstripped NAMA’s 
administrative capacity).40 NAMA determined a transfer schedule for each tranche and 
provided it to the relevant participants. The transfer schedule included the assets that NAMA 
would acquire from the relevant participant and the consideration price NAMA would pay, 
which would be “the lower of the amount owed by the borrower and the loan’s long-term 
economic value” (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010).  
NAMA’s original intention was to value and purchase the first tranche immediately, which 
would contain the largest exposures, and then do the same for a new tranche every 30 days 
until an expected completion date of June or July 2010 (Houses of the Oireachtas October 
2009; Houses of the Oireachtas November 2009). However, these 30-day and mid-year goals 
proved overly optimistic. Although NAMA aimed to finish purchasing its assets by the end of 
2010, NAMA ultimately had to revise this end date several times between 2009 and 2011 
(NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010) because of issues in its participants that included 
multiple management information systems (MIS), poor data management infrastructure, 
 
40 The 2010-02-26 European Commission state aid decision said that “It is [was] anticipated that the first 
tranche will include the 10-15 largest borrower exposures across all participating institutions” (Martin 2010). 
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paper records, “unreliable key performance metrics,” and “[p]oor data collection capacity” 
(Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). 
On September 30, 2010, the Minister for Finance requested that NAMA finish transferring 
assets as soon as possible and announced that “all remaining NAMA transfers should be 
completed in one single tranche for each of the participating banks” (NAMA Acquisition of 
Bank Assets 2010). The Minister for Finance then issued a direction and two statutory 
instruments on October 22, 2010, which incorporated this goal into NAMA’s governing 
documents. The direction and one of these statutory instruments added an additional 
function (and processes for fulfilling said function) to NAMA: take “all necessary steps to 
acquire” eligible bank assets from participants” as expeditiously as possible” (National Asset 
Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). The other statutory instrument amended the 
March 3, 2010, statutory instrument dealing with the calculation of the “Long-Term 
Economic Value of property and Bank Assets” (S.I. No. 504 2010). After consulting with 
NAMA’s Board and the EC, the Minister for Finance also requested that NAMA table its 
acquisition of loans from AIB and BOI where the borrower’s exposure was less than €20 
million, shrinking the number of eligible assets that NAMA intended to acquire to around 
€73.4 billion (NAMA Acquisition of Bank Assets 2010). On November 28, 2010, however, 
Ireland’s Financial Regulator issued a statement reversing course: NAMA would now acquire 
all of AIB and BOI’s exposures (including those less than €5 million) (PCAR 2011). The 
Financial Regulator’s statement was codified in the National Asset Management Agency 
(Amendment) Bill 2011, but the Bill was never passed, and the reversal was never 
implemented (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
NAMA accordingly began an accelerated transfer of most of the assets in its remaining 
tranches (three through nine) between October and December 2010 (NAMA Annual Report 
2011; NAMA Progress Report 2014). NAMA would use the new valuation process “for 
purposes of expedited acquisitions” to calculate the amount of consideration NAMA would 
give to participants during this accelerated transfer (S.I. No. 504 2010).41 This leveraged 
sampling rather than loan-by-loan valuations (Honohan 2019). In the process, NAMA 
acquired these assets, it would conduct more detailed due diligence, produce a final long-
term economic value for the assets, and revise its consideration cost accordingly (S.I. No. 504 
2010).42 NAMA would not finish purchasing the remaining €3.4 billion in assets and 
conducting due diligence on assets purchased after the fourth tranche until March 2012 
(European Commission 2014). By that point, NAMA had purchased a total of €74.4 billion in 
assets for €31.7 billion, leaving the participants with an average haircut of 57% (Oireachtas 
Inquiry 2016). The EC officially approved these transfers on July 29, 2014 (European 
Commission 2014). 
 
41 In NAMA’s 2011 Annual Report, its CEO noted that “we had little information on the underlying collateral 
from the participating institutions” when they acquired the assets in tranches three through nine (See NAMA 
Annual Report 2011, 12). 
42 After adjustments, NAMA realized its final valuation was around €0.5 billion more than its provisional 
valuation and paid the banks the difference (See NAMA Progress Report 2014). 
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19. Asset Management and Disposal: NAMA’s exit and disposal strategies were 
determined based on due diligence conducted on its borrowers. 
Once NAMA had acquired an asset, it effectively took the position of the participating 
institution who had originally held the assets. NAMA used this legal leverage (the ability to 
“take enforcement against borrowers in default”) to motivate borrowers to submit business 
plans to NAMA (Carroll and Dodd 2012). However, NAMA itself did not take direct ownership 
of much property (NAMA Management of Loans 2012). NAMA only directly owned €6 
million worth of property and had not directly sold any of this type of property by the end of 
2011. 
If the borrower in question was a major borrower (as defined by NAMA), they submitted a 
“realistic business plan which set out their current assets and liabilities” to NAMA within 
three months of joining the scheme. Upon analyzing the business plan, NAMA then proposed 
(and negotiated) short term and long term repayment strategies with the borrower (Martin 
2010; Williams 2014). NAMA ultimately developed five types of strategies: 
● Full Restructuring: Borrower goes through a full refinancing with new terms and 
conditions. 
● Partial Restructuring: Nearly the same as “Full Restructuring” but “did not result in 
new loan agreements.” Instead, they set down the terms for borrower compliance in 
“Connection management agreements (CMAs).” 
● Support: Borrower received financial support from NAMA on the condition that it 
“implement a number of milestones in relation to debt reduction.” 
● Consensual Disposal: Large scale asset sale by the borrower over a “relatively short-
term horizon.” 
● Enforcement: Although this was only deployed when the debtor was not cooperative 
or the debtor could not demonstrate viability, this strategy involved NAMA enforcing 
the debts using whatever legal powers it had at its disposal (NAMA Second Progress 
Report 2018). 
If NAMA and the borrower could agree on a strategy, NAMA and the borrower collaborated 
on making the arrangement feasible, potentially involving, but not limited to, debt 
restructurings and write-offs that the borrower would present to NAMA in a “request for 
support.” If these negotiations failed (or if collaboration failed to make the agreement 
feasible), NAMA asked for full repayment from the borrower, threatening enforcement 
proceedings (Williams 2014).  
If the borrower in question was not a major borrower, the participants would provide asset 
management services, but the credit decisions were made by NAMA and NAMA was 
represented in each of the banking units (Williams 2014). These borrowers would have the 
relevant participant submit information on their financial performance to NAMA. Then, 
NAMA would sort borrowers based on the “level of their exposure, […] creditworthiness and 
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[…] level of impairment,” and prioritize the larger and more impaired borrowers for 
assessment under the procedure for major borrowers “as a matter of urgency” (NAMA 
Business Plan 2009). During YPFS discussions with NAMA staff, they expressed a sentiment 
that, if they were to run NAMA again, they would leave less asset management 
responsibilities with participating institutions or work with other firms to provide those 
services (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with author, 
February 26, 2021). That being said, they noted that such a strategy might not have been 
viable in 2009 and 2010, as there were not as many credit and tax firms to provide such 
services in Ireland. 
During NAMA’s 2011 due diligence and business plan assessment process, NAMA appeared 
to change its procedure for assessing the business plans of debtors managed by NAMA’s 
participants. Instead of only analyzing business plans at the debtor level, NAMA began to 
accept business plans at the “debtor connection, debtor or loan level depending on the 
individual characteristics of each case.” NAMA also changed this procedure by adopting a 
system, which NAMA called a “credit grading matrix,” for grading debtors on a combination 
of debtor performance and expectations of debtor recovery, although NAMA would not fully 
implement the system until 2012 (NAMA Annual Report 2012; NAMA Annual Report 2011). 
On November 25, 2010, in line with NAMA’s attempt to expedite its asset purchases during 
late 2010, NAMA put forward a more “streamlined” version of its “Debtor Business Plan 
Requirements,” which replaced the original business plan for most debtors. The original, 
which NAMA described as requiring “detailed and comprehensive information,” was 
ultimately only used for “major debtors with complex corporate structures and whose loans 
transferred as part of the first three tranches” (NAMA Annual Report 2010; Debtor Business 
Plan Version 2 2010). 
Ultimately, NAMA seemed to have a preference for disposing of its assets by sale “on the open 
market by private treaty, public auction, public tender and sealed bid” (private treaty is 
essentially the same as a private contract) (EBS 2017; Cas and Peresa 2016). NAMA 
frequently chose to package large numbers of related loans (typically after improving the 
underlying collateral) and selling them to large institutional investors (Cas and Peresa 
2016).  
Another feature of NAMA’s disposal strategy was how NAMA dealt with the potential conflict 
between NAMA’s purpose and NAMA’s functions (as outlined in the NAMA Act). While 
NAMA’s functions gave the organization a commercial primary mandate (to realize the best 
value for the assets), the purposes of the NAMA Act 2009 encompassed the stabilization of 
the banking system, improving liquidity, and contributing to social and economic 
development (National Asset Management Agency Act 2009, Revised 2018). In practice, this 
meant that NAMA would focus on its primary mandate. However, NAMA did conduct 
numerous operations related to social and economic development. This included a rent 
abatement program for tenants of NAMA borrowers and the demolition of “unfinished 
housing estates” (more popularly known as “ghost estates”). In response to the tight credit 
markets of 2012, NAMA created a vendor finance program for properties held by NAMA 
borrowers and receivers in Ireland and the UK. NAMA committed up to €2 billion over four 
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years for the program in May 2012, which would fund up to 75% of the purchase of 
properties by making medium term loans to new investors (NAMA Second Progress Report 
2018; Vendor Finance 2014). However, NAMA only provided €384 million under the facility 
by the end of 2016 (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018). NAMA looked to “Ireland’s exit 
from the Troika programme [the IMF program it entered in the last quarter of 2010], the 
recovery in the Irish economy in recent years, increased investment in Ireland by 
international investors and the wider availability of capital provided by international and 
debt providers,” as well as “the introduction of Irish REITs as an alternative investment 
mechanism” as an explanation of the limited demand for the program (Vendor Finance 
2014). 
In 2012, NAMA also introduced the Deferred Payment Initiative for residential property 
purchases (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018; NAMA Deferred Payment Initiative 2014). 
In the program, buyers would pay 80% of the price upfront and would pay no additional 
amount if “after five years, the value of the house has fallen by 20% or more relative to its 
original purchase price” (NAMA Deferred Payment Initiative 2014; NAMA Second Progress 
Report 2018). In cases where, after five years, “the value of the house has fallen by less than 
20% or has increased, the amount ultimately payable will be the lesser of the value of the 
house or the original purchase price” (NAMA Deferred Payment Initiative 2014). The 
program stopped accepting participants in May 2014, having only assisted in the purchase 
of 103 properties (NAMA Second Progress Report 2018).  
20. Timeframe: NAMA had a long-term strategy for managing its assets, but did not 
have an organizational sunset date. 
Once a loan moved onto NAMA’s balance sheet, NAMA began managing it and preparing for 
its exit. NAMA anticipated that it would conduct 7-10 years of asset management and then 
terminate itself. NAMA was not created with a sunset date; NAMA was to continue operating 
until its Board decided the organization should be wound down (Carroll and Dodd 2012). 
NAMA intended to recover about half of its investment through “partial or full restructurings, 
including by supporting debtors” and the “other half [of its investment] by disposals 
(consensual and enforced)” (Cas and Peresa 2016). 
III. Evaluation 
The EC broadly praised NAMA, stating that “By using a centralised asset protection scheme, 
banks effectively reduced the burden of legacy assets and strengthened their deleveraging 
and recapitalisation process.” It continued on to say that NAMA’s assets were “clearly 
defined, limited in size and relatively easy to sell,” which helped NAMA manage and dispose 
of its assets (European Commission 2015). Additionally, the European Commission noted 
that NAMA’s profitability also benefitted “from having part of its asset portfolio located in 
the UK and especially London, as this allowed for significant sales before 2013 as property 
prices in the UK market started recovering earlier (around 2010) (See Figure 11). NAMA 
then was able to add value to its properties and benefit from the Irish property market’s 
recovery beginning in 2013 (Cas and Peresa 2016). 
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Figure 11: NAMA Property Collateral disposed of by the end of 2012 by location  
 
Collateral sold to 
NAMA (November 
2009 value in € 
billions) 
Proceeds of 




November 2009 values 
(in € billions) 
Dublin 0.5 0.4 -0.1 
Rest of Ireland 0.2 0.2  
Northern Ireland 0.1 0.1  
London 3.6 4.7 1.1 
Rest of Great Britain 0.9 0.9  
Rest of world 0.5 0.5  
Total 5.8 6.8 1 
 
Source: NAMA Progress Report 2014, 55. 
Charles Enoch of the IMF lamented the impact of a “lack of a universally accepted 
methodology for the valuation of assets,” which he said, “led to a protracted process whereby 
bank book values were repeatedly discounted, prolonging uncertainty, delaying 
normalization of bank funding, and undermining the credibility of the process” (Enoch 
2013). 
A review of three GFC-era asset management companies (AMCs) by the EC billed NAMA as a 
success story. It pointed out NAMA as having been “the most advanced of the three” AMCs 
when it came to asset sales, but argued that this was related to NAMA’s macroeconomic 
situation and the fact that NAMA’s assets were homogeneous, yet spread across multiple real 
estate markets. The review also commended NAMA for its tendency to sell its loans as “large 
packages to institutional investors,” describing it as a tactic that helped NAMA enhance the 
value of its assets. The paper continues, writing that NAMA’s expansive legal powers 
improved its ability to conduct speedy asset disposals and “ensure income generation from 
rentals.” With the ability to accelerate disposals of its impaired assets, NAMA was able to 
help “develop a functioning secondary market for distressed assets by sending a price 
signal.” However, it also noted that NAMA may have been less successful if it “had acquired 
Irish residential mortgage loans” and NAMA’s practice of “adding value” to its assets could 
distort the commercial property market (Cas and Peresa 2016). A World Bank study asserts 
that NAMA’s success was underpinned by its homogenous asset mix; NAMA’s acquisition of 
residential mortgage loans would make the AMC’s portfolio less homogenous. The same 
study also partially attributes Spain’s AMC’s issues offloading its real estate assets to the 
organization’s holding a mix of small residential and large commercial assets. Acquiring 
residential mortgage loans would mimic this less desirable mix.  
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As for the issue of NAMA’s value-addition activities potentially distorting the “ordinary 
functioning of the commercial property market,” this mostly pertained to NAMA’s work 
pursuing new development projects (Cas and Peresa 2016). NAMA’s size alone also did give 
it influence over some of the commercial property markets in which it was involved (BBC 
2011). 
Additionally, it asserted that NAMA’s practice of “Combining original goals with additional 
socio-economic activities” could deter NAMA from its “primary mandate” as well as 
contribute to “conflicting objectives.” Perhaps most importantly, the paper noted that NAMA 
had to be accompanied by other initiatives to repair the financial sector. It went on to say 
that post-crisis regulatory changes would render the lessons to be learned from NAMA less 
relevant in future. As for the first point, NAMA’s actions were not able to prevent Ireland 
from continuing to suffer a “very high NPL ratio” and “subdued […] lending to the private 
sector” (Cas and Peresa 2016). NAMA’s own annual report from 2010 buttresses this point: 
For a period, it perhaps had been reasonable to anticipate that NAMA on its own 
could have fixed the banking system, if the problem had been confined to the loan 
categories designated for NAMA. However, the sheer scale of the banks’ problems, 
which went far beyond the land and development and associated loans within 
NAMA’s mandate and which only emerged after NAMA’s work had begun, meant 
that [the] initial expectation was not realizable. (NAMA Annual Report 2010) 
As for the second point, due to changes in the Eurostat rules, majority privately owned AMCs 
like NAMA are now  formally included on the government balance sheet, thus making them 
difficult to implement when governments are financially constrained (Cas and Peresa 2016). 
However, credit rating agencies considered NAMA debt to be on the government balance 
sheet even during the organization’s early days anyways, which shows the limits of the 
strategy even before it was reined in by Eurostat (European Commission 2019a; Cullinan 
and Beers 2010).   
The point of view of two analysts from the German Federal Statistical Office was that the 
“initial impact of its [NAMA’s] operations on general government’s deficit and debt” was 
effectively nil. This made NAMA “more advantageous […] in comparison to the German 
liquidation sub-agencies.” However they also believed this advantage would be “to a large 
extent reduced by later government payments” that happened when the Irish government 
had to inject capital into a number of the participating banks to keep them in compliance 
with “international equity standards” once the participating banks recognized NAMA’s 
haircuts on their balance sheets (Braakman and Forster 2011).  
A 2015 paper from Professor Dirk Schoenmaker of Erasmus University Rotterdam also 
praised NAMA, writing that it “serves as an international example of successful management 
of bad assets” (Schoenmaker 2015). In stark contrast to a World Bank study authored by 
Caroline Cerruti and Ruth Neyens, Schoenmaker argued that NAMA’s decision to purchase 
assets at November 30, 2009, values was a prudent one.43 He accepts NAMA’s view that the 
 
43 That being said, a 2013 debate in the Oireachtas suggests that NAMA maintained the November 30, 2009 
reference date due to the “regimental” requirements of calculating EU state aid (McDonagh 2013a). 
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purchase date “protected the banks from any further deterioration of the Irish property 
market” that would’ve come as a result of the 25-30 percent decline in property values after 
November 30, 2009. However, he also lamented that the government did not implement a 
proposal to have NAMA acquire “smaller commercial real estate loans,” popularly known as 
“NAMA II.” Schoenmaker also stated that external asset management may have helped 
resolve Ireland’s stock of non-performing mortgages faster, “but the ECB made such schemes 
financially unattractive as it limited ECB funding to banks only, excluding resolution 
vehicles” like NAMA (Cerruti and Neyens 2016; Schoenmaker 2015). 
A World Bank study authored by Caroline Cerruti and Ruth Neyens gave NAMA a mixed 
review (Cerruti and Neyens 2016). They praised NAMA’s asset management structure as 
“offering the benefits of creating economies of scale in administering workouts, expediting 
loan resolution with specific expertise, and breaking “crony capitalist” connections between 
banks and developers.” They noted that NAMA’s clear commercial mandate, transparency 
and independence, “efficiency in managing the assets,” and good property mix allowed for 
NAMA’s “strong performance,” but did not substantially focus on NAMA’s other mandates 
(such as its ability to promote social and economic development). They also complimented 
NAMA for following through on “two key principles […]: no fire sales and no hoarding,” and 
for professionalizing the Irish real estate market through its loan packaging program. 
However, they also argued that the uplift NAMA applied to assets when calculating their 
long-term economic value (ultimately an average of 8.3%) and the choice to value the assets 
as of November 30, 2009, caused NAMA to overpay for its assets (because property prices 
continued to fall after November 30, 2009). They note several other areas where NAMA 
could have improved. Specifically, they attribute NAMA’s loss of “critical staff” to NAMA’s 
failure to maintain its program of linking bonuses with performance. Similar to 
Schoenmaker, they also lament that NAMA’s lack of purview over non-land and non-
development loans kept it from fully cleaning up the Irish banking system, but they do not 
go as far as to say that NAMA should have been involved with these other loans. 
This perspective, in which NAMA was an effective program, but by no means a panacea for 
Ireland’s problems, is similarly reflected by the Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of 
Ireland in a September 22, 2017, speech (Sibley 2017). He stated that NAMA was part of the 
solution, but “was by no means the silver bullet some people may think for resolving Irish 
NPLs overall, as SME and mortgage loans remained a serious and growing problem.” As 
evidence, he pointed to the fact that NPLs “only peaked in Ireland in Q4 2013, with an NPL 
ratio of 31.8%, more than two years after loans were transferred to NAMA.” Patrick 
Honohan, the former head of Ireland’s central bank, also saw NAMA as an organization that 
could not have been expected to solve Ireland’s economic woes on its own. Even if NAMA 
(and/or the Irish government) had overcapitalized the banks and shrunk the haircuts that 
the AMC would apply, Honohan argued that “to have done so would simply have brought 
forward the melt-down that happened in the autumn” of 2010 (Honohan 2019). His belief 
was that the Irish government simply did not have the fiscal capacity to handle the problem 
at the point without official-sector support from abroad. 
The government’s 2016 Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Banking Crisis (the 
Report) provided the opinions of NAMA’s external auditor, the Comptroller & Auditor 
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General (C&AG). The C&AG argued that NAMA chose a poor way to operationalize its 
mandate to seek “the best achievable financial return,” deciding to measure it through 
NAMA’s ability to redeem debt instead of some kind of “expected or target rate of return”. 
The C&AG also criticized NAMA for its failure to realize its anticipated rental income in 2011 
(Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). The C&AG noted that NAMA’s asset purchases “removed a 
considerable element of the prevailing uncertainty about the credit institutions’ financial 
position in the aftermath of the banking crisis” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2015). 
The 2016 Report itself criticized the government for the one-year lag between NAMA’s 2009 
announcement and NAMA’s first transfers, saying that the lag caused “considerable 
uncertainty and difficulty for some developers, as they were caught in a ‘no man’s land’ 
between their financial institutions and a NAMA not yet formally established.” It went on to 
note that NAMA had negative effects on a number of the property developers who were 
“borrowers” in the program. Although the report conceded that NAMA’s practice of acquiring 
good assets in addition to bad assets from the participants allowed NAMA “to get more value 
from individual borrowers,” it damaged the reputation of at least one borrower of a 
participating institution in the process (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). 
NAMA was evaluated negatively in various left-leaning segments of Irish society as well as 
in the media. One reason for this was that NAMA socialized losses related to the financial 
crisis while supporting banks that ultimately still had to be bailed out and sometimes wound 
down (Williams 2014, 142). Journalist Frank Connolly criticized the organization for “failing 
to obtain the best return for the Irish people […] by seeking to offload the properties as 
rapidly as possible” while allowing for a revolving door between NAMA’s staff, NAMA’s 
executives, and the property development industry (Connelly 2017). This point of view was 
echoed in one statement from the 2016 Report that “[NAMA] acted more as a debt collection 
agency than as a property value maximising entity” after receiving a recommendation from 
the troika to “accelerate NAMA receipts” (Oireachtas Inquiry 2016). Critics also faulted 
NAMA for a perceived lack of transparency in its operations as well as for leaking confidential 
information (Williams 2014).44 These criticisms tended to revolve around alleged 
malpractice by NAMA in its valuation and sale of large portfolios to institutional investors, 
resulting in a comprehensive investigation by the C&AG in August 2016 (C&AG 2016, 9; 
Houses of the Oireachtas 2016). Finally, in March 2016, a Financial Times article reported 
that developers blamed NAMA “at least partly, for Ireland’s acute housing shortage” (Boland 
2016). When NAMA pivoted its activities toward property development, it also encountered 
criticism from the press. Stephen Dodd, a commentator on the NAMA Act 2009, questioned 
the legal basis of NAMA’s shift toward property development and the provision of affordable 
housing. Stephen Dodd, a commentator on the NAMA Act 2009, later questioned the legal 
basis of NAMA’s shift toward property development and the provision of affordable housing. 
 
44 Discussions with NAMA staff told a more complicated story. They considered NAMA’s transparency 
limitations to be a double-edged sword (Susan McDermott and Jamie Bourke of NAMA, Zoom discussion with 
author, February 26, 2021). On one hand, they lamented that their Code of Conduct and compliance with the 
Official Secrets Act 1963 made it difficult to fully tell their side of the story to the public sometimes. On the 
other hand, if NAMA were a more transparent seller, and provided more information about its purchase 
(particularly the purchase price) of specific assets, NAMA might be put at a disadvantage as a seller. This would 
then hurt the taxpayer.  
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Dodd argued that “There is no authority for policy initiatives such as the use of Nama 
property for social housing unless they generate the optimal financial return compared to 
alternative uses” (Dodd 2012).45 Despite the negative press, media reports acknowledge that 
NAMA seemed pretty good at clearing NPLs and that non-participating banks were similarly 
criticized for selling off assets to foreign “vulture funds” (Moore 2018).  
NAMA’s initial April 2009 proposal prompted support in the Irish media, but this support 
wavered by the time the NAMA Bill was introduced at the end of the summer (Mercille 2015). 
Although government officials and NAMA’s personnel consistently reiterated that NAMA was 
not a bailout and that the purpose of the organization was to clear the toxic assets off of bank 
balance sheets to allow for lending, “NAMA soon became perceived in the public 
consciousness as the agency through which the government put the interests of the banks 
ahead of the interests of its people” (Murphy 2011). It was difficult for the public to 
understand what exactly NAMA did and how NAMA would eventually help lending start 
again.46 These problems were so significant that the NAMA Act was only able to pass by a 
majority of four votes after a debate involving all-night meetings of the legislature (Connolly 
2017).  
Some continued to consider NAMA to be a bailout for developers. This was because there 
was a perception that NAMA sold loans back to developers at a discount. The Public Accounts 
Committee said that NAMA facilitated an “unacceptable" a lack of "systematic and routine 
verification of section 172 declarations." These declarations were supposed to keep 
developers from repurchasing their former properties from NAMA at a discount (Larkin 
2019). According to Social Democrat TD Catherine Murphy, “the public expectation was that 
someone would not be able to buy back their loans at a discount.” However, the fact that the 
vast majority of NAMA’s sales were of loans  rather than property  and that the sales were 
largely not by NAMA itself meant that section 172 was largely irrelevant (The Irish Examiner 
2019). 
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3 to 9) of assets to NAMA (European Commission July 29, 2014) 
European Commission state aid decision approving of NAMA’s valuation and purchase 
procedures for its last tranche of purchases (the bulk tranche). 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/subject-state-aid-sa38562-2014n-ireland-transfer-last-
tranches-tranches-3-9-assets-nama. 
Subordinated Bonds Term sheet (March 24, 2010) 
Term sheet outlining the details of the subordinated bonds that partially funded NAMA’s 
purchases and would pay interest if NAMA met unspecified financial milestones. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-subordinated-bonds-term-sheet 
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
Direction Concerning the Issuance of Government Guaranteed Debt by NAMA (May 14, 
2010) 
Direction (order) from the Minister for Finance that placed the price of all short-term 
government guaranteed NAMA debt in a band linked to the price of securities issued by the 
Housing Finance Agency. It also set up a similar band for the price of NAMA debt with a 
maturity of over one year relating to the price of Irish government bonds of similar maturities. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/direction-national-asset-management-agency-pursuant-
section-141-national-asset-management-0. 
ECB Guiding Principles for Bank Asset Support Schemes (February 25, 2009) (Treasury 
2009a)  
ECB guidance on the design of asset purchase operations. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ecb-guiding-principles-bank-asset-support-schemes. 
National Asset Management Agency (Determination of Long-Term Economic Value of 
Property and Bank Assets) Regulations 2010 (S.I. No. 88 of 2010)  
Regulation revising the processes for valuing NAMA’s assets and the underlying property, which 
followed discussions with the European Commission on appropriate discount rates. 
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no-5682009-national-asset-management-agency-designation-eligible. 
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management-agency-act-2009-regarding. 
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https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/statutory-instrument-si-no-5042010-national-asset-
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no-5052010-national-asset-management-agency-conferral-additional. 
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https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/subject-preliminary-view-esa95-accounting-treatment-
national-asset-management-agency-nama. 
The Minister for Finance directs the Agency to expedite the acquisition of remaining loans 
from the participating institutions (October 22, 2010)  
Order from the Minister for Finance for NAMA to consolidate its outstanding tranches of assets 
to be acquired into a single “bulk” tranche. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/national-asset-
management-agency-act-direction-under-section-14-issued-october-22-2010. 
Press Releases/Announcements 
Ed Sibley: Non-performing loans – the Irish perspective on a European problem Speech by 
Mr Ed Sibley, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, at the second annual 
conference of the ESRB, Frankfurt am Main (September 22, 2017) 
Academic speech outlining the development of Ireland’s non-performing loans problem. It 
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includes a number of details relevant to the extent that NAMA ameliorated the problem. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/ed-sibley-non-performing-loans-irish-perspective-
european-problem. 
Financial Statement of the Minister for Finance Mr Brian Lenihan, T.D. 7 April 2009  
Speech by the Minister of Finance announcing measures that include the first mention of NAMA. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/financial-statement-minister-finance-mr-brian-lenihan-
td. 
NAMA completes transfer of second tranche of loans from Anglo Irish (August 23, 2010) 
Press release announcing the successful transfer of the ANGLO assets in the second tranche. 
This completed NAMA’s second tranche asset purchase program. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-completes-transfer-second-tranche-loans-anglo-
irish. 
National Asset Management Agency - First Loan Transfers (March 30, 2010)  
Press release announcing its first asset purchases and describing their book value, 
consideration value, and discount rate. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-commences-
loan-transfers-participating-institutions. 
National Asset Management Agency - First Bank of Ireland Loans Transfer (April 2, 2010)  
Press release announcing the completion of NAMA’s asset purchases related to the first tranche 
of Bank of Ireland assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-acquires-first-bank-
ireland-loans. 
National Asset Management Agency - First AIB Loans Transfer (April 6, 2010)  
Press release announcing the completion of NAMA’s asset purchases related to the first tranche 
of AIB assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-completes-transfer-first-tranche-
loans-aib. 
National Asset Management Agency - Tranche 2 Loans Transfer Begin (July 19, 2010)  
Press release announcing the beginning of NAMA’s asset purchases related to the second 
tranche of assets. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-completes-second-tranche-loan-
transfers-aib-boi-inbs-and-ebs. 
Proposal for a National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) (April 8, 2009)  
Initial proposal and justification for NAMA. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/evaluation-
options-resolving-property-loan-impairments-and-associated-capital-adequacy. 
Reports 
‘Bad Banks’ in Ireland, Spain and Germany: Diverging Fortunes (October 27, 2015) 
Report from Moody’s comparing and contrasting the performance of SAREB, NAMA, and FMS. 
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Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency 
Acquisition of Bank Assets October 2010 (October 7, 2010)  
First major oversight report by NAMA’s official external auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor 
General of the Republic of Ireland (C&AG). https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-
and-auditor-general-special-report-national-asset-management-agency-acquisition. 
Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency 
Management of Loans (February 2012) 
Report from NAMA’s official external auditor on the development (as well as the 
implementation) of NAMA’s loan management processes. It also offers a survey of the assets in 
NAMA’s portfolio. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-and-auditor-general-
special-report-national-asset-management-agency-management. 
Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency 
Progress Report 2010 – 2012 (April 2014) 
Report from NAMA’s official external auditor on NAMA’s overall performance over its first three 
years. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-and-auditor-general-special-report-
national-asset-management-agency-progress. 
Comptroller and Auditor General Special Report National Asset Management Agency Second 
Progress Report (June 29, 2018) 
Report from NAMA’s external auditor on the longer-term implementation of NAMA and its 
progress toward winding down its operations. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/comptroller-and-auditor-general-special-report-
national-asset-management-agency-second 
Initial Evaluation of NAMA Operations (December 6, 2011)  
Pro-bono, high-level (management consulting style) analysis of NAMA’s early operations. Some 
of its findings contributed to NAMA’s 2012 reorganization. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/letter-and-report-minister-finance. 
NAMA Annual Reports for 2010-2018  
Section of NAMA’s website containing its annual reports and companying presentations for 
2010 to 2018. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/national-asset-management-agency-
annual-reports-webpage. 
Nama Business Plan (June 30, 2010)  
Presentation outlining NAMA’s first official business plan (how NAMA intended to operate) as 
well as the results of NAMA’s first tranche. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-business-
plan-30th-june-2010. 
NAMA Key Tranche 1 Data (May 10, 2010)  
Presentation outlining the surprising results from the first tranche of asset purchases. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-key-tranche-1-data-may-10-2010. 
NAMA one year later – A Lombard Street Research Report for the Construction Industry 
Federation November 2010 NAMA – a flawed idea and a failure (November 2010)  
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Privately commissioned report on NAMA from the point of view of the Construction Industry 
Federation. The report is critical of NAMA and it appears to be for advocacy purposes. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/nama-one-year-later-lombard-street-research-report-
construction-industry-federation. 
NAMA QUARTERLY REPORT (Section 55 NAMA Act 2009) (June 30, 2010)  
NAMA’s second quarterly financial report of its activities from its establishment to June 30, 
2010. https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/section-55-quarterly-report-nama-act-2009-
quarterly-financial-statements. 
Patrick Honohan: Recapitalisation of failed banks – some lessons from the Irish experience 
(September 7, 2012) 
Speech-cum-academic paper with a useful description of the recapitalizations preceding and 
following NAMA’s asset purchases. It also provides a useful outline of the impact of NAMA’s 
initially overly optimistic performance estimates for its portfolio. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/recapitalization-failed-banks-some-lessons-irish-
experience. 
Stabilising and Healing the Irish Banking System: Policy Lessons (January 12, 2015) 
Short academic paper giving commentary on Ireland’s overall crisis response. There’s a 
particularly relevant section looking at the potential (but rejected) expansion of NAMA. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/4145. 
Treatment of Special Bank Interventions in Irish Government Statistics (2011)  
Paper coming from the Central Bank of Ireland and Ireland’s Central Statistics Office that 
analyzes how the various guarantees, nationalizations, capital injections, and asset purchases 
interacted with Irish and European sovereign debt accounting rules. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/treatment-special-bank-interventions-irish-
government-statistics. 
What Makes a Good ‘Bad Bank’? The Irish, Spanish and German Experience (May 24, 2016) 
Report from European Commission analysts putting together best practices from three public 
asset management companies implemented within the European Commission during the GFC. 
It also contains a useful discussion of changing Eurostat regulations and the growing relevance 
of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) to the operation of such companies. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/3681. 
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